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Abstract
This thesis considers the design of a social network that addresses the shortcomings
of the existing ones, and identifies user privacy, security, and service availability as
strong motivations that push the architecture of the proposed design to be distributed.
We describe our design in detail and identify the property of resiliency as a key objec-
tive for the overall design philosophy.
We define the system goals, threat model, and trust model as part of the system
model, and discuss the challenges in adapting such distributed frameworks to become
highly available and highly resilient in potentially hostile environments. We propose
a distributed solution called MyZone to address these challenges based on a trust-
based friendship model for replicating user profiles and disseminating messages, and
evaluate the feasibility of our solution based on availability, resource utilization and
scalability.
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1 Introduction
Social network is a form of social structure that consists of users connected to each other based
on a set of commonalities. An Online social network (OSN) facilitates a social network using
online services. The most notable feature of OSNs is the possibility of remote interactions among
users. In addition, most of them provide a variety of other features, from facilitating users to ex-
pand their social circles through common interests, mutual friends, or even searching for long lost
acquaintances, to sharing different contents with different users either individually or as groups, to
allowing users to reflect interest or opinion on shared contents, and much more.
One advantage of OSNs is their high reachability which is a byproduct of human behavior: peo-
ple tend to be medium for each other. Therefore, OSNs would provide users with an even broader
audience than just their immediate friends. This has enabled OSNs to emerge as a pervasive and
almost ubiquitous social media. As a result, their social impact has been demonstrated around
the globe both at the local and global scales. These features have had a huge impact on the over-
whelming popularity of OSNs. Due to these appealing features OSNs have enjoyed huge success
in attracting loyal users.
The most successful OSNs have been free of charge for their users. The main asset of an OSN
service provider comes from its number of users, which in turn translates to its influence. The
profit earned by an OSN service provider comes from the value of the user information. OSN
service providers have complete access to user data, in some cases, even long after they leave the
OSN. This enables them to profile their users individually, and target them with more specific ads,
based on history of their interactions. This has essentially made OSNs a very successful media
for effective advertising. In this respect, OSN users are both its consumers and products, i.e. they
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use its seemingly free services but on the other hand they provide information that can be used for
effective targeted advertisement. In addition, user information can also be sold to third parties.
Although, users of most OSN services have to agree to a set of privacy policies dictated by the
OSN service provider, most people blindly agree to them and implicitly allow the OSN service
provider to abuse their information by selling them to market researchers and advertisers, which
will ultimately be used for targeted advertisement. In more extreme cases, some third party ap-
plications have been responsible for causing security breaches by installing adware and spyware.
To make matters even worse, continuous changes in privacy policies of OSNs have resulted in
frustrated users who (perhaps rightly so) are becoming more suspicious.
A recent survey has indicated that more and more people are taking precautions when it comes
to using OSN services[15]. This user privacy violation is the most serious shortcoming of conven-
tional OSNs and stems from a centralized server architecture that enables a single entity i.e. the
OSN service provider, to have complete access to all of its users. Later in this thesis, we introduce
an alternative distributed architecture, in which users own their data, and have it hosted only by a
number of trusted peers, i.e. friends.
A second shortcoming that many OSN users are facing today is, that of government imposed
censorship. OSNs and social media are in widespread use today as a political tool, giving people a
voice and a way to express, and spread their opinions freely and effectively. In some cases, espe-
cially in those parts of the world that have yet to enjoy free media, this has led to popular uprisings.
In light of recent events in the Middle East and North Africa, social networks such as Twitter[17]
and Facebook[16] have been (perhaps rightly) credited as one of the main contributors to political
changes in Egypt and Tunisia[13, 27]. This has caused many concerned governments to censor
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OSN services[19, 21, 30]. This can be easily achieved either by traffic filtering or implementing
attacks on the OSN service provider or even asking providers to block their services to an entire
nation[24].
The centralized server architecture of current OSNs is thus quite brittle and vulnerable to denial-
of-service attacks that simply pull the connection to the server. Some measure of distribution is
possible, i.e. Facebook can have many points of presence spread throughout the globe. However,
it is still a client-server solution, and the offending government can easily identify local OSN
servers and shut down those links. Instead, we believe a next-generation OSN should be able
to function even if the link to the outside world is severed. Local communication can still be
effectual without requiring a connection to the rest of the net, though certainly the social experience
is enhanced once the link to the outside world is re-established. Furthermore, this property of
resiliency to fragmentation should hold at smaller granularities, so that there should still be islands
of connectivity within which users can communicate despite censorship efforts aimed at further
partitioning.
There are a variety of OSN services available today and the number of OSN service providers
is increasing on daily basis. This abundance of choice (due to features, policies etc.) has caused
existing users to be inefficient when it comes to managing their online profiles on different OSNs.
In addition, it has caused new users to wander when it comes to selecting an OSN. Using different
user interfaces across different OSNs and adapting to confusing changes and features within the
same OSN is also inconvenient for many users. Using a single social network service that adapts
to the needs of its users replacing all other OSN services is the ultimate goal that would address
these shortcomings.
3
Finally, hosting a huge amount of user information has made OSN service providers an at-
tractive target of security attacks and the fact that a limited set of data centers are hosting all the
user information would amplify the damage caused by a successful attack. It is evident that as
the demand for OSNs increases, it intensifies the negative effects of these shortcomings on user
experience, and at some point, the need for an alternative approach to todays OSNs is imminent.
All of these have motivated us to design a new OSN architecture that would address all these
shortcomings, while preserving all the benefits of existing OSNs.
Almost all the obstacles mentioned earlier are somehow caused by the centralized nature of
existing OSNs. In our work, we envision MyZone a next-generation OSN that moves beyond the
centralized architecture of existing OSNs, and instead incorporates distributed P2P networking
in a way that is resilient, privacy-preserving, and secure. The nature of OSN services and their
requirements make this problem unique and more challenging as we discuss in section 5.2. But for
now we give a brief incite as to why the existing peer to peer solutions can not be applied to this
problem.
There are two broad categories of peer to peer architectures: Unstructured and Structured. An
unstructured peer to peer design for online social network services would result in a very poor
performance due to routing inefficiencies. The structured peer to peer systems have been very
successful in practical applications and there has been an enormous amount of research on these
kinds of systems. The essence of all these systems is the use of Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs)
in some part of the design. We argue that using DHTs to implement peer to peer OSNs would not
be feasible as the requirements of such services are out of the scope of DHTs.
The most serious problem using DHTs is the replication of user profiles to provide availability
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when users are offline. Although DHTs have proven to be a success dealing with availability
issues, they are mostly used to replicate contents that are not going to be modified. Even in some
cases where the replicated content is modified, the modifying entities are not restricted to a specific
selection of users. OSN services are interactive in nature. Furthermore, they restrict the access to
profiles by implementing access as well as modification policies. Therefore, using a pure DHT
solution would not be possible. One possibility of implementing this restriction is by sharing
a common key between all friends of a user and replicating the encrypted profiles, using this
common key.
There are three problems with this approach. First, even assuming that the shared keys are not
going to be obtained by non-friend users, revoking a friendship translates into revoking the shared
key, issuing a new key, sending it to all friends, and finally re-encrypting the entire profile using the
new key. This process is very inefficient considering the fact that revoking friendships can occur
frequently.
Second, a simple modification of the user profile by a friend e.g. a one word comment, may
translate into sending the entire encrypted profile to the friend and re-encrypting it by the friend
after making the modification, and sending it back to the mirror. This process is also inefficient
and would result in unnecessary use of bandwidth, traffic, and power resources.
Even if the updates are encrypted in a way that prevents this to happen e.g. sending encrypted
updates to the mirror and appending them to the end of the encrypted profile, it is still very hard to
send a particular part of the profile from the mirror to the friend since the entire profile is encrypted
and the mirror does not know which chunks of the encrypted profile should be sent.
Finally and probably most importantly it would be impossible to implement application level
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permissions e.g. who can see what part of the profile or modify it, since the profile is encrypted
using a shared key. Furthermore, the mirror will not be able to impose those permissions since it
does not know the key. Of course sharing the key with an unknown mirror would compromise the
user privacy and profile integrity. Another problem with DHTs is that all nodes should have public
IP addresses which is not feasible with the limited public IP addresses available 1. Thus, because
of the special features and functionalities of OSNs, DHTs can not and should not be used to host
OSN services.
The contributions of our work presented in this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a new distributed social network called MyZone as a solution to all the weak-
nesses of existing centralized social networks.
• We identify all the challenges that need to be addressed as part of the design of such a system.
• We describe the entire design of MyZone in detail. Our design will address two deployment
scenarios: a local deployment used to create a private social network used by small number
of users, and a global deployment used to create a public social network with many more
participants.
• We explain how our design makes MyZone a resilient social network that will function under
different security attacks while providing complete privacy for the users and protecting them.
• We provide detailed information on the implementation aspects of MyZone and prove its
feasibility by implementing a feature rich client application based on our design.
1Maybe in the future where IP6 is going to replace the current IP4, this issue will not be applicable anymore.
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• Finally, we evaluate MyZone based on three aspects, i.e. availability, scalability and resource
utilization. Based on the results of our evaluation, we show that MyZone’s replication tech-
niques result in high profile availability while the client application uses little resources and
is scalable for even much larger than average number of friends for current users of popu-
lar social networks like Facebook. We conclude that based on our design features and our
evaluation results, MyZone can be a stepping stone for the next generation of online social
networks that are more privacy oriented and secure while at the same time provide competing
levels of quality of service with that of existing centralized social networks.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows, next chapter states the research problem and the
expected outcome of our work. Chapter 3 reviews the related works and research on peer to peer
social networks, chapter 4 states the assumptions about the system environment where MyZone
would be deployed. Chapter 5 describes challenges that are faced while designing a system, in
addition to the expected functionalities and guarantees that the system should provide.
In chapter 6, we describe our two layered design architecture of MyZone. The lower layer
provides a secure infrastructure in form of a set of services for the upper layer, which implements
the features supported by MyZone. Chapter 7 describes the measures embedded into the design in
order to address security attacks under different scenarios. Chapter 8 describes the packages imple-
mented at the service and application layers and defines the interfaces for each component of each
layer. Chapter 9 evaluates MyZone based on three aspects, namely, availability, resource utiliza-
tion and scalability. Finally, in chapter 10, we summarize our work and point out our contributions
and identify potential future research directions.
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2 Problem Statement
In this work we plan to design a next-generation online social network called MyZone, that would
address all the shortcomings of existing OSNs described in chapter 1. Specifically, MyZone would
be privacy preserving, secure, resilient to many kinds of attacks, and it will support a variety of
client applications with different features.
In addition to designing such an online social network, we implement the local deployment part
of the service layer of our design described later in chapter 6, and a sample client application that
supports the functionalities and features described in section 6.2. Finally, we evaluate availability,
resource utilization and scalability of MyZone using a real world deployment as well as large scale
emulations. Our real world deployment is done using 104 users. The main reason that we are using
104 users for our experiment is that our measurements can be applied to a large scale deployment
as well. This is due to the fact that the system is peer to peer and only the average number of
friends is the important factor as opposed to the total number of users in the entire network. Since
the average number of friends is in the order of hundreds, even in case of large social networks like
Facebook, our results can be generalized to a wide range of participation scenarios where the total
number of users is in the order of millions.
3 Related Works
There have been several attempts at P2P social networks, motivated by the desire to achieve user
privacy. In this section we briefly visit some of the existing works while outlining their insuffi-
ciencies. Cutillo et al.[11] propose a decentralized and privacy-preserving OSN application called
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Safebook that provides two types of overlays: A set of matryoshkas which are concentric structures
created around each node to provide data storage and communication privacy, and a P2P substrate
providing lookup services. The process of building a matryoshka for a node starts at that node as
a core selecting some trusted friends as mirrors and creating the first layer. This process will be
repeated by each selected friend until a sufficient number of layers is constructed around the core
node. Each node in the matryoshka only knows about the identity of its neighbors in the adjacent
layers. A message can only be routed to a core node through its matryoshka starting at the outer-
most layer. Any kind of offline communication can be served by the mirrors. The main purpose
of safebook is to prevent identity theft and backtracking of user requests. In the process it also
achieves availability by replicating user profiles on their mirrors i.e. the nodes on the innermost
layer of user’s matryoshka.
There are several problems with this approach. First, a node can only join safebook by invitation
since it needs to ask the existing node to create the matryoshka. Another problem is that the
reachability of a user on safebook depends on the number of mirrors i.e. first layer nodes, that it can
obtain and since this number is fixed obtaining that many nodes is another problem. Furthermore,
in case the user is not online, the offline messages like wall posts are stored in encrypted format
retrievable only by the user on the mirrors. This means that these updates are not accessible until
the user comes back online and publishes those updates. Safebook uses DHTs to find entry points
for each node and DHTs are maintained by a third party so the system would be dependent upon
another P2P system. Another serious problem with safebook is that it does not address friend
revocation that is an inherent part of any OSN. Finally, using the overlay matryoshkas would result
in longer paths on the IP infrastructure yielding in poor performance.
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Buchegger et al.[9] proposed another distributed P2P social network application called Peer-
SoN. PeerSoN has a two-tier architecture: a look up tier that uses DHT and a second tier that
consists of peers and contains the user data, such as user profiles. They provide a very high level
design of the system and their prototype did not provide encryption at the time. In PeerSoN it is
implicitly assumed that the users are connected most of the time although it may be through differ-
ent devices and from different locations. It is not clear if and how these devices would be synced
with each other. Offline messages are stored on the DHT which means that the system can’t be
scalable since DHT has limited storage. Furthermore, the authors did not address the problem of
replication which means that the profile of a user is not accessible if she is offline. Finally, friend
revocation is not considered as a functionality of the system.
Vis-a`-Vis[25] is an OSN design that uses a Virtual Individual Servers (VIS) as a personal virtual
machine running in a paid compute facility. In Vis-a`-Vis, a person stores her data on her own
VIS, which arbitrates access to that data by others. VISs self-organize into overlay networks
corresponding to social groups. Vis-a`-Vis is designed so that it can interoperate with existing
OSNs. Users are responsible to distribute their public keys and the IP address of their VISs. The
main problem with this approach is that users have to pay for a VIS and in many cases take charge
of maintenance of their own VIS.
Cuckoo[31] is a microblogging decentralized social network that uses a centralized OSNs only
as backup and as a byproduct saving bandwidth costs and reducing downtime while performing
equally well. Cuckoo organizes user clients into a structured P2P overlay using pastry. Besides
the Pastry routing table, each user also maintains four lists for friends, neighbors, followings and
followers. A user maintains connection with m of its online friends and together make up a virtual
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node V N via request redirection. Each user also maintains n random followers. The idea revolves
around the fact that m and n are chosen so that if a user has a small number of friends or followers
it would store all of them otherwise it would store a fraction of them. Returning users retrieve
updates by using flood-based search for influential users and DHT based search for normal users.
Content propagation is done in two ways. A normal users directly pushes messages to his fol-
lowers while contents generated by influentials are pushed using gossip-based methods between
neighbors. Cuckoo does not provide any encryption and can only be applied to microblogging
services like Twitter with very limited functionalities. Finally, all the previous works implicitly
assume public IP addresses for peers and they don’t address the problem of NAT traversal.
A variety of past and ongoing projects on P2P social networking include Diaspora[1], The
Appleseed Project[2], and Peerbook[3]. One serious shortcoming of these projects is that, they
require an actual server that is up an running all the time. Obtaining a publicly accessible server is
not free of charge, and it needs regular monitoring and maintenance on behalf of the user, requiring
server administration knowledge. In spite of free OSN services, it is very unlikely that these
solutions would succeed.
In addition, there is existing work on secure and anonymous P2P networking, e.g. Darknet[7],
GNUnet[4], I2P[5], Bunzilla[6], and Freenet[10]. In spite of all these projects, and in spite of all
the obstacles facing conventional OSNs, still it is safe to say that P2P social networking is far from
being considered as a threat to OSN providers Due to their distributed nature, in large measure
because the aforementioned P2P OSNs lack major competing features compared to centralized
OSNs.
At the current state, the trend seems to indicate that users would prefer features and convenient
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user experience at the cost of privacy violations. Therefore, we believe that P2P OSNs would only
be able to compete with their centralized counterparts if they can provide the same features and
functionalities at the same level of user experience. MyZone is designed to ultimately achieve the
goal of providing competitive features offered by conventional OSNs while supporting key benefits
like privacy, security, and resiliency.
4 Assumptions
In this chapter we first state the system properties that MyZone requires in order to function. This
is followed by the definition of the security model composed of 1) a trust model that describes the
trusted entities in the system and their trust relations with each other, and 2) an adversary model
that identifies different adversaries, their resources, and the kind of attacks that they can implement.
4.1 System Requirements
We divide the system requirements into two categories: participating devices and network infras-
tructure. We make the following assumption for participating devices:
1. The devices can be desktops, laptops or smartphones and tablets with network connectivity
either through ethernet or wireless interfaces.
2. Although each device can be behind any kind of firewall or NAT, a reasonably small number
of devices should be able to obtain public IP addresses.
3. Out of all those devices with public IP addresses, at least one, should have two network
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connections, i.e. dual homed, with different public IP addresses.
4. A very small fraction of those participating devices with public IP addresses e.g. one to ten
percent, should be able to host databases that serve a reasonably small number of peers.
5. Finally, for the purpose of platform independency, we have used Java to implement the
services provided to the application. Therefore, in our case, we require each device to be
capable of running Java applications. This requirement is not restrictive since Java is instal-
lable on all computers and in case of smartphones, Android based smartphones are shipped
with this capability.
The network requirements are very simple and include the following:
1. There exists a functioning IP infrastructure at all times, even though it may be partitioned to
some extent either intentionally or due to unpredictable outages.
2. For enhanced user experience, a minimum bandwidth of 5 Mbps is recommended but not
required.
4.2 Security Model
As mentioned earlier, the security model consists of a trust model, that defines the trusted entities
and their relationships with each other, and an adversary model, that identifies different types of
adversaries, their capabilities, and the kind of attacks that they can implement. We first start with
the description of the trust model.
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4.2.1 Trust Model
We define four levels of trust in MyZone:
• Trust as a certificate authority: Users put their utmost trust in CA to act as a certificate
authority for the social network. The CA issues certificates to all users, and users can verify
all the certificates that are issued by the CA.
We assume that the CA is not penetrable by malicious nodes, while it can be target of other
attacks. Also, the CA will never act maliciously during its lifetime. These assumptions are
essential for the OSN to function, and everything falls apart if one of these assumptions fails.
• Trust as a user: User A can verify the identity of user B. This can be done through a
certificate issued to B by a certificate authority (CA) that is trusted by A.
• Trust as a friend: User A trusts user B as her friend and gives B read and write access to its
profile. This trust is symmetric but not transitive.
• Trust as a mirror: User A trusts user B as her mirror and grants B permission to serve as
A’s mirror whenever A is unavailable. User A already trusts B as a friend, hence, this is a
stronger level of trust.
• Trust as a replica: In this scenario, user A is a friend of user C and user B is a mirror for
user C. User A trusts user B to act as a benevolent mirror on behalf of user C whenever C
is unavailable.
This kind of trust can be referred to as “trust by proxy” and it is in a way, derived based on a
transitive relationship on “trust as a friend” and “trust as a mirror”. One important property
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of this type of trust, is its one directional read and write access, i.e. only A can read from
and write to C’s replicated profile on B, and B can’t modify or read A’s profile.
We assume that two friends will not act as adversaries for one another. This does not apply to
friends of friends, since trust is not transitive. We also assume that a benevolent mirror is trusted
with the integrity of data (it will not maliciously modify the data) but it may act to gain profile
information from its clients, i.e. mirrors can be “honest but curious” users.
4.2.2 Adversary Model
Types of adversaries: There are three types of adversaries that may be present in the system:
• Users that are “honest but curious” who want to view the user profiles of non-friend users.
• Malicious entities that are not users of the OSN, but want to attack the system in one of the
following ways:
– Eavesdropping.
– Spoofing: This includes DNS hijacking.
– (Distributed) Denial of Service.
– IP or URL filtering.
– Backtracking: an attempt to trace some contents back to a user, e.g. a government
agency trying to find the user who is responsible for some particular content.
• Malicious entities that are also users of the OSN. We assume that these entities are not friends
of the users they are trying to attack. These entities are perhaps, the most dangerous of all.
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They can have resources to implement the following attacks on peer to peer systems that
deploy DHTs, such as our design:
– Sybil attacks: an attacker creates a large number of identities and dominates the over-
lay network, by fooling the protocols, and subverting mechanisms based on redun-
dancy.
– Eclipse attacks also known as routing table poisoning: an attacker controls a suffi-
cient fraction of the neighbors of the correct nodes. Hence some correct nodes can be
eclipsed. This type of attack applies to network proximity based DHTs such as Pastry
[23] and Tapestry[32].
– Routing attacks: an attacker may do a combination of the following:
1. Refuse to forward a lookup request.
2. It may forward it to an incorrect, non-existing, or malicious node.
3. It may pretend to be the node responsible for the key.
– Storage attacks: a node routes requests correctly, but denies the existence of a valid
key or provides invalid data as a response.
Motivations of adversaries: In general, malicious entities have two motivations:
1. Gather information about users and use it against them or, the social network as a whole, e.g.
implementing a divide and rule policy among users by spreading mistrust.
2. Prevent access to the social network, and hence, create an outage to a subset of the system.
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Adversary resources: We make the following assumptions in terms of the resources available to an
adversary:
• An adversary has access to “portions” of the IP infrastructure and can filter the URL or IP
address of individual devices on the network.
• The number of IP addresses and URLs that an adversary can filter is limited to only a small
fraction of the number of overall devices that participate in the social network.
• An adversary has the ability to execute a successful DDOS attack on a limited set of devices
at any point in time.
• An adversary does not have sufficient computational power to crack strong symmetric or
asymmetric cryptographies.
• Finally, an adversary has enough resources to create a limited number of malicious entities
in different roles as components of the OSN.
5 Design Goals and Challenges
In this chapter we describe the main goals that are guiding the design of MyZone, and describe the
challenges facing it.
5.1 Design Goals
In the introduction, we described the following shortcomings for the existing OSNs:
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1. User privacy violations on behalf of the OSN service providers.
2. Government imposed censorship aimed at repressing popular uprisings by means of prevent-
ing the OSN services being used as tools for facilitating these movements.
3. User confusion and frustration resulting from abundance of different OSNs, and frequently
changing policies and features that are imposed by the OSN service providers.
4. The undeniable threat of hijacking user information from centralized data centers by targeted
attacks.
The eminent need for a next generation of OSNs that addresses these shortcomings has moti-
vated MyZone towards the following goals:
• It should preserve user privacy by ensuring that users own their own data, and no central
authority or third party can access user information without explicit permission from the
user.
• User privacy preservation should not come at the cost of losing functionalities provided by
existing OSNs. Therefore, it should support all primary functionalities of a conventional
OSN like Facebook. These include the ability to establish and revoke friendships, sharing
contents and comments with friends at different levels, and participating in discussions.
• It should be highly resilient in face of malicious attacks as well as infrastructure failures
caused by unpredictable causes. The OSN continues to function in isolated islands (which
will be referred to as “local deployment”) while facing network partitioning, and possesses
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self healing properties, by automatically reconciling the states after the partition has been
restored.
• It should tolerate a high rate of churn due to mobile users, and seek to provide near 24/7
availability of user profiles (best effort).
• Due to the growing trend of switching to smartphones and tablet computers, the underlying
computing platform consists of traditional desktops and laptops with high bandwidth net-
work connections, as well as portable devices with restricted resources. To deal with the
latter, the system should be designed to be minimally demanding of the limited resources of
portable devices, and should incorporate power/resource management techniques.
5.2 Challenges
The shortcomings of existing OSNs, demand a distributed architecture for the next generation of
OSNs. Based on the distributed architecture, the assumptions mentioned earlier, and the design
goals, we identify six key challenges in the design, implementation, and deployment of MyZone:
availability, resiliency, routing, connectivity, security, and traffic optimization and power manage-
ment.
5.2.1 Availability Challenges
An important property of OSNs is that a user profile is always available regardless of whether
that user is currently online or not. This is made possible by storing user profiles in a central
server/data center that is available all the time. Providing this property in a distributed OSN, where
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user profiles are not replicated at any central server is further complicated by high rate of churn.
Overcoming this challenge is perhaps the key to the success of a distributed OSN.
In the absence of a central server, profile replication must be considered as an intrinsic part of
the system design. The key question is where should a user profile be replicated, i.e. how to select
mirrors for replicating a user profile. There are two design choices with this regard: mirroring a
user profile on a set of devices belonging to random users; or replicating the user profile on a set
of devices belonging to users that are trusted by the owner of the profile.
Deploying DHTs would use the first approach to replicate user profiles. Although DHTs have
proven to be a success, dealing with availability issues, they are mostly used to replicate contents
that are not going to be modified. Even in some cases where the replicated content is modified,
the modifying entities are not restricted to a specific selection of users. One possibility of imple-
menting this restriction is by sharing a common key between all friends of a user and replicate the
encrypted profiles, using this common key.
There are three problems with this approach. First, even assuming that the shared keys are not
going to be obtained by non-friend users, revoking a friendship translates into revoking the shared
key, issuing a new key, sending it to all friends, and finally re-encrypting the entire profile using the
new key. This process is very inefficient considering the fact that revoking friendships can occur
frequently.
Second, a simple modification of the user profile by a friend e.g. a one word comment, may
translate into sending the entire encrypted profile to the friend and re-encrypting it by the friend
after making the modification, and sending it back to the mirror. This process is also inefficient
and would result in unnecessary use of bandwidth, traffic, and power resources.
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Even if the updates are encrypted in a way that prevents this to happen e.g. sending encrypted
updates to the mirror and appending them to the end of the encrypted profile, it is still very hard to
send a particular part of the profile from the mirror to the friend since the entire profile is encrypted
and the mirror does not know which chunks of the encrypted profile should be sent.
Finally and probably most importantly it would be impossible to implement application level
permissions e.g. who can see what part of the user profile or modify it, since the profile is encrypted
using a shared key. Furthermore, the mirror will not be able to impose those permissions since it
does not know the key. Of course sharing the key with an unknown mirror would compromise user
privacy and profile integrity. Thus, because of the special features and functionalities of OSNs,
DHTs can not and should not be used to host OSN services.
The only feasible solution would be the second approach and we believe that candidate designs
must investigate the second approach, where users find other trustworthy users amongst existing
friends to replicate their profiles. Finding friends who are willing to be mirrors and convincing
them to serve as mirror either through social ties, or proposing incentives, would be an interesting
problem on its own.
In addition to the issue of selecting mirrors, there are several other aspects of replication man-
agement that must be addressed given the dynamic nature of the system due to churn. These are:
1. When and how profile updates are propagated to other mirrors.
2. How to maintain replica consistency among all mirrors.
3. What type of replica consistency is appropriate for this application.
4. Whether a user profile is completely or partially replicated at different mirrors.
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5. Whether the mirrors themselves should be prioritized as primary, secondary, and so on.
5.2.2 Resiliency Challenges
The proposed system is intended to be deployed in an infrastructure that is vulnerable due to: 1)
mobile users with widely varying Internet connections, and 2) malicious entities that may try to
partition the social network or bring down the system. Hence the system needs to be resilient in
such environments and must be self-healing.
5.2.3 Routing Challenges
A key requirement of the OSN is that, users must be able to locate their (mobile) friends and
establish connections when they join the system. This is further complicated by the high rate of
churn.
One approach is that all users register their IP addresses on a rendezvous server when they join
the system . A user then, would contact this server with appropriate credentials to determine the
current IP addresses of her friends. This solution suffers from the major drawback of the server
being a single point of failure. In addition, that single rendezvous server needs to be trusted since
it would have a global view of the social graph and it can derive social relationships, which is not
desirable.
A second approach is to use a distributed hash table (DHT) scheme to hash an individual’s
username to a particular rendezvous server for lookup, but then we have to implement an efficient
mechanism that would prevent the rendezvous server in charge of a user i from disclosing user i’s
IP address to users that are not her friends. This is to prevent targeted attacks on i. Our design
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would focus on the second approach.
5.2.4 Connectivity Challenges
The user devices participating in the OSN are mostly behind firewalls or NATs (around 90%).
NATs are divided into four types:
• Full Cone NAT: Once an internal address (iAddr:iPort) is mapped to an external address
(eAddr:ePort), any packets from iAddr:iPort will be sent through eAddr:ePort and any ex-
ternal host can send packets to iAddr:iPort by sending packets to eAddr:ePort.
• Address Restricted Cone NAT: Once an internal address (iAddr:iPort) is mapped to an ex-
ternal address (eAddr:ePort), any packets from iAddr:iPort will be sent through eAddr:ePort
and an external host (hAddr:any) can send packets to iAddr:iPort by sending packets to
eAddr:ePort only if iAddr:iPort has previously sent a packet to hAddr:any. ”Any” means the
port number doesn’t matter.
• Port Restricted Cone NAT: Once an internal address (iAddr:iPort) is mapped to an exter-
nal address (eAddr:ePort), any packets from iAddr:iPort will be sent through eAddr:ePort
and an external host (hAddr:hPort) can send packets to iAddr:iPort by sending packets to
eAddr:ePort only if iAddr:iPort has previously sent a packet to hAddr:hPort.
• Symmetric Cone NAT: The NAT mapping refers specifically to the connection between the
local host address and port number and the destination address and port number and a binding
of the local address and port to a public side address and port. Any attempts to change any
one of these fields requires a different NAT binding.
23
This is the most restrictive form of NAT behavior under UDP, and it has been observed that
this form of NAT behavior is becoming quite rare, because it prevents the operation of all
forms of applications that undertake referral and handover.
Configuring firewalls and NATs to forward requests to a particular internal host is not common
knowledge for many users, and may not be possible in some cases. An alternative way to avoid
reconfiguring NAT is called NAT traversal.
A common method of NAT traversal is for an internal host to send a UDP packet to an outside
host first, and depending on the type of NAT, the internal host may be able to receive connections
from all, or a subset of external hosts afterwards. This method is commonly known as UDP hole
punching. Except for the full cone NAT, the use of UDP hole punching limits the extent of external
hosts that can connect to the internal host. In fact UDP hole punching is impossible on symmetric
cone NATs.
Although full cone NATs are commonly used by home users, a good portion of users are behind
other kinds of NATs. Connecting peers that are behind NATs is another challenge that must be
addressed, otherwise the application of such OSN would be limited to very few users that have
access to public IP addresses.
5.2.5 Security Challenges
Our design needs to provide the following security guarantees:
• Confidentiality: Prevent the disclosure of profile information to any user that is not a friend.
• Integrity: A user profile can only be viewed and modified by her friends.
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• Availability: The OSN is resilient against DDoS attacks and URL/IP filtering, and user pro-
files are “almost always” available.
• Authenticity: Every modification of a user profile is authenticated.
• Consistency: A weakly consistent view of the profile is always available.
The consistency and availability guarantees are bound to be best effort as the benefits gained
through absolute availability and total consistency are not worth the added complexity in the design
of the OSN. This tradeoff is described in the CAP Theorem[8], which stipulates that there is a
tradeoff in distributed systems between consistency, availability, and partitioning (in our case due
to attacks and/or user churn).
5.2.6 Traffic Optimization and Power Management Challenges
As mentioned in chapter 4, users may use a wide range of devices to participate on the OSN, in-
cluding smartphones and other portable devices, laptops and desktop computers. In addition each
user device may also act as a mirror for another user. A key challenge is to provide availability
while dealing with resource-constrained devices. Portable devices are primarily constrained by
energy and bandwidth limitations, though memory and CPU limitations also play a factor. A chal-
lenge is to develop a replication strategy that takes into account these limitations while providing
availability and resiliency. One strategy is to leverage more resource-rich devices, i.e. online desk-
tops, to support the bulk of mirroring duties, and to use mobile mirroring only as a strategy of last
resort.
Heterogeneity of device resources and their limitations call for optimized resource usage of the
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system, especially with regards to traffic and power management schemes. Such a system should
try to save as much energy and bandwidth as possible (memory and CPU are not as critical as power
and bandwidth in portable devices). For example, a pushing scheme would prove less efficient in
terms of power and traffic optimization as opposed to a pulling scheme when it comes to reflecting
user profile updates to friends.
6 System Design Architecture
This chapter gives a detailed description of our design. Our design is based on a two layered
architecture. The lower layer referred to as the service layer provides essential services to the
components of the system and facilitates the registration of peers, finding peers, establishing con-
nections between peers and much more.
These services are designed to provide a reliable, resilient and secure infrastructure addressing
the requirements of peer to peer applications, from NAT traversal, to reliable UDP connections,
to secure socket services, and more. Hence, the service layer can be used by any peer to peer
application that requires these features and is not specific to just OSNs.
The upper layer is referred to as the application layer. This layer provides the specific features
and functionalities of the OSN. In addition, it is responsible for implementing higher level security
policies such as read and write permissions for particular users or groups of users. Profile repli-
cation is also done at this layer. Next we describe the two layered architecture starting from the
lower layer.
26
6.1 Service Layer
The service layer provides an infrastructure that is resilient against partitioning, reliable even on
top of UDP, and secure against malicious attacks. It is also very dynamic and can be used by peers
behind all kinds of firewalls and NATs. In this section we describe the service layer by describing
its components and their interactions with each other.
We divide our proposed design of the service layer into two parts based on the nature of their
deployment. A local service layer that is used for local deployment, and a global service layer
that is used for global deployment. The purpose of local deployment is to establish a private OSN
intended to be used in more restricted environments.
Perhaps a very useful application of a private OSN is in democratic movements opposed by the
government entities, where the OSN services can be used to organize protests, spread news, share
ideas, and much more, when the access to the outside world is blocked or limited.
In fact the local deployment model can be used in form of a package that we call Democracy IN
A Box (Dinab) for these specific purposes. To assure maximum security, our entire design builds
upon “the need to know basis” philosophy which mandates that any information would only be
available to those entities that must know about it.
The local deployment is intended to be used by a small number of users, compared to the global
deployment where the number of users is unbounded. The use of the OSN by the general public is
considered as global deployment. In our design the global deployment model is an expansion of
the local deployment model. Therefore, we describe the local deployment model first, and then we
explain how it is expanded to the global deployment model.
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Let’s examine the steps that a peer should take, in order to establish a secure connection with
another peer. A peer can directly connect to another peer if, 1) the IP address of the other peer is
known, and 2) the peer either has a public IP address, or is behind a NAT that can be traversed using
UDP hole punching. If the NAT traversal is not possible then the peer can only receive connections
through a relay.
In order to be able to establish a secure connection between peers, they should be able to verify
the identities of each other. This can be done by using certificates, which means, a certificate
authority that is trusted by all peers needs to exist. Based on the steps mentioned earlier, the local
deployment model consists of five components:
• STUN server: STUN (Simple Traversal of User datagram protocol (UDP) through Network
address translators) features an algorithm to allow endpoints to determine NAT behaviors.
The STUN server is needed so that peers can determine the type of NAT they are behind.
The protocol is lightweight and is documented in RFC 3489. The STUN server is the only
entity that needs to run on a dual homed machine with two public IP addresses.
• Certificate Authority: The CA server would issue certificates to each new user and verifies
that the usernames are unique. We assume that peers have already obtained the public key
of the CA which is needed to verify the certificates. Note that several CAs can coexist in the
system and a user can have several certificates issued by different CAs.
• Rendezvous Server: Peers need to register with rendezvous servers in order to be discovered
by other peers. The server should be able to host a database. This database stores the
information for peers as well as relays. In case, a peer needs a relay to accept connections,
28
it will query the rendezvous server for a relay server.
• Relay Server: The relay server would relay the connection between two peers in scenarios
where the peer acting as server is behind an un-traversable NAT. The relay server can’t
decrypt the relayed connection and therefore, the relayed connection is viewed as an end to
end secure connection between the two peers.
• Peers: The devices that host the user profiles and represent users.
Figure i shows the components of the service layer for local deployment and the sequence
of steps to establish a connection between two peers. The sequence of steps for each peer is
represented as i.x where i is the peer and x is the step.
Now we describe the interactions between the components, based on the sequence of steps
illustrated in Figure i. Prior to the steps that a peer should take, a relay server must register with a
rendezvous server so that it can be reached by peers that are behind un-traversable NATs. Figure ii
describes the sequence of messages exchanged between the relay server and the rendezvous server
to achieve this.
The registration starts by the relay server sending its serving port, and the total number of peers
acting as servers that can be relayed, as its capacity. The rendezvous server notifies the relay server
if the registration was unsuccessful, or sends back an acknowledgment with a number, indicating
the interval in milliseconds, between update packets needed to be sent from the relay server to the
rendezvous server. The rendezvous server treats the received update packets, as indicators that the
relay server is alive. If the rendezvous server does not receive these update packets for a defined
period of time, it will remove the corresponding relay server from its relay server table.
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Figure i: Deployment diagram for local deployment .
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Figure ii: Sequence digram of the scenario where a relay server registers with a rendezvous server.
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Figure iii: Sequence diagram of the scenario where a peer requests a certificate from a certificate
authority (CA).
Upon successful registration, the relay server would periodically send out update packets with
its current load, capacity, and port number, to indicate that it is alive.
The first step that a peer should take is to obtain a certificate from a trusted certificate authority
(CA). This is essential, since a peer needs to be able to prove its identity to other components when
required. Figure iii shows the sequence of messages exchanged between a peer and the certificate
authority (CA) during this process. We remind the reader, that the public key of the CA is already
stored on the peers’ devices. The peer starts by generating its own pair of keys. It would then send
its username and public key, encrypted by an asymmetric encryption algorithm e.g. RSA, using
the public key of the CA.
This message also includes the length of the unencrypted username and public key. This is
because, asymmetric encryption uses block cipher, which means that the plain message has to be
padded to fill appropriate number of complete blocks before encryption. At the time of decryption
the length of the plain message needs to be known, so that the padded part can be trimmed from
the decrypted message.
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In addition, the message digest will be computed over all plain data that are encrypted, and will
be appended to the message. If everything checks out and the username does not already exist on
the CA’s database, the CA would reply with the issued certificate for the user, encrypted using the
user’s public key.
Although encrypting the certificate itself does seem unnecessary at first, it is essential to keep
the identity of the requester, hidden from any malicious entity that monitors the requests sent to
the CA. This is especially important in hostile environments where a government entity is trying
to find the identity of the users that are participating on the OSN by monitoring all the connections
going to the CA, since the IP address of the CA is publicly available.
Note that this step is only done once, and after the initial sign up process, the peer would not
need to communicate with the CA anymore. Finally, we emphasize that the CA is the “only”
entity in the entire design that is assumed to be trusted by all other components and in fact, all
other components are assumed to be untrustworthy.
After obtaining the certificate the next step is for the peer to discover whether it is behind a
NAT or firewall and if it is, what type. This is done using the standard STUN protocol mentioned
earlier. The reader can refer to RFC 3489 for in depth description of the protocol. If the peer is
behind a non-full cone NAT, it would need to obtain a relay server address, and register with it, in
order to accept connections from external hosts.
Figure iv shows the process of requesting a relay server address from the rendezvous server.
This process is very simple and starts by a peer sending a request relay server message to
the rendezvous server and ends by the rendezvous server sending back either the IP address and
port number of a relay server, or a no relay available message.
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Figure iv: Sequence diagram of the scenario where a peer requests for a relay server from a ren-
dezvous server.
In case there are more than one relay servers registered with the rendezvous server, the ren-
dezvous server selects the relay in a way that ensures balanced loads across all relays. Request-
ing a relay server does not contain any critical information and can be initiated by anyone even
non-participating devices. Hence, the messages exchanged during this process don’t need to be
encrypted.
After requesting for a relay server address, the peer proceeds by registering with that relay
server. Each relay server has to verify the identities of peers that are registering with it. As
illustrated in Figure v, this starts with the peer that is going to receive connections via the relay
server, sending its certificate appended to a is server message, indicating that it is acting as a
server.
The relay would verify the identity of the peer by sending back a timestamp encrypted using
the public key extracted from the user’s certificate. This timestamp is then decrypted by the user
and sent back to the relay server. This method ensures the authenticity of the user and is immune
to replay attacks but not man in the middle attacks. We will address man in the middle and other
types of attacks in chapter 7. Upon successful registration, a keep alive interval is sent back to the
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Figure v: Sequence diagram of the scenario where a peer registers with a relay server.
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peer. This requires the peer acting as server, to send a server is alive packet to the relay
server indicating that it is still alive. This mechanism removes the dead connections from falsely
filling up the capacity.
Then comes the important step of a peer, registering with the rendezvous server. Figure vi
represents the sequence of messages exchanged in this process. The first message is sent by the
peer and includes the peer’s certificate, while the reply carries the session key generated by the
rendezvous server, and encrypted by the public key of the peer. If the session key is correctly
retrieved by the peer, it sends the following encrypted information to the rendezvous server:
1. Device priority: The priority of the device being registered on behalf of the user since a user
may use several of her own devices as a method of self replication on the system. We explain
the concept of self replication in the next section.
2. Port number.
3. Type of NAT: full cone, non-full cone, or public IP address.
4. Type of protocol: TCP or UDP.
5. IP address.
6. Relay server address: 0.0.0.0 if relay server is not being used.
7. Relay server port.
8. List of passphrases: this is a list of unique strings of characters generated by the peer.
Passphrases are generated in such a way that they do not hold any relationship with the
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actual usernames. The peer would have a passphrase for each friendship as we explain in the
next section.
The look up queries for each peer include the passphrase instead of the actual username, as
will be described later. This is to ensure that the access to a user registration information is
limited to those who know one of her passphrases, and not to the general public.
9. List of mirrors: the mirror list of a peer includes the usernames of its mirrors. We explain the
concept of mirroring as part of the application layer functionalities later in the next section.
10. Signed message digest over the following information: IP address, port number, type of
protocol, relay server address, relay server port and the list of passphrases. This signed mes-
sage digest ensures the authenticity and the integrity of the data sent back by the rendezvous
server.
11. Signed message digest over the list of mirrors.
The rendezvous server will store all this information in its database. Upon successful regis-
tration with the rendezvous server, the server returns a peer registered reply along with
optional list of pending friendship requests. The friendship requests for peer i are stored in form of
friendship requester’s username, and a passphrase specifically generated for i encrypted using the
public key of peer i. Encrypting the friendship requester’s passphrase for i is mandated based on
the need to know basis philosophy, and prevents malicious entities including rendezvous servers,
to look up the IP address of the friendship requester, by providing the passphrase.
Peer i can look up the connection information for peer j, if 1) peer j has already registered with
a rendezvous server and, 2) peer i has a passphrase with peer j. Figure vii demonstrates how a look
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Figure viii: Sequence diagram of a scenario where a peer connects to another peer.
up query is performed. The first two messages establish a secure connection. After the session key
is retrieved, the peer sends the passphrase of the target peer to the rendezvous server. Upon finding
a username corresponding to that passphrase in its passphrase table, the rendezvous server replies
with the connection information of the target peer. The information includes the signed message
digest described earlier, which will be used by the peer to verify the integrity and authenticity of
the reply.
Finally, peer 1 can connect to peer 2 after obtaining its connection information using the se-
quence of messages described in Figure viii. This process starts by peer 1 sending its certificate
to peer 2. Peer 2 would then send back its certificate encrypted using peer 1’s public key. This
encryption prevents an entity monitoring peer 1’s traffic from figuring out the identity of peer 2.
After the successful exchange of certificates, peer 1 generates a session key and encrypts it first
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Figure ix: Sequence diagram of the scenario where a peer sends friendship request to a rendezvous
server.
using peer 2’s public key and then, its own private key. This double encryption ensures that the
session key can only be retrieved by peer 2 preventing any kind of attack compromising the session
key. This single message has a crucial role in the security of the entire service layer. Peer 1 can
securely communicate with peer 2 after the session key has been successfully retrieved by peer 2.
In addition to all previous steps, the service layer also provides a method for a peer to send
friendship requests for other peers. All friendship requests for a particular peer x are sent to the
rendezvous server, instead of sending them directly to x. There are two reasons for this. First, peer
x might not be online at the time of sending the friendship request and therefore may not receive it.
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Second, all friendship requests not necessarily end in friendships and the connection information
of peer x should not be revealed to other peers unless x has accepted their request and has a shared
passphrase with them.
Figure ix shows the sequence of messages exchanged between peer y sending a friendship
request for x, and the rendezvous server in charge of x. This process begins by sending a session
key generated by the rendezvous server in order to establish a secure connection. Next, peer y
sends the username of x to the rendezvous server. The rendezvous server then, sends back the
certificate of x, if an entry for x can be found in the peers table of the rendezvous server.
Finally, y sends its passphrase generated exclusively for x encrypted by x’s public key, back to
the rendezvous server. The passphrase can only be decrypted by x, and therefore, x would be able
to look up y if it chooses to accept the friendship request. Friendship revocation at the service layer
is done by simply removing the passphrase that corresponds to the revoked friendship, from the
list of passphrases. In addition, the secure socket is implemented so that it would only allow access
to the application layer if the connected user is a friend, or a requested friend. When a friend is
deleted from the friend list the service layer denies all access to that user.
Based on queries that are sent to the rendezvous server during different steps, the rendezvous
server needs to host a database. Figure x represents the schema of this database. The database
includes five different tables: peers, friendship requests, passphrases, mirrors, and relay servers.
The peers table stores all the connection information of registered peers. Lists of passphrases
and mirrors for each user are stored in passphrases and mirrors tables respectively. The friendship
requests table stores all the friendship requests for registered peers. Finally, the relay servers table
stores all the information for registered relays.
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Figure x: Database schema for the rendezvous server database.
Now that we have described the local deployment service layer, we can introduce the global
deployment as an extension of the local deployment model. As mentioned previously in 5.2.1 due
to the inherent nature of OSNs, DHTs can not be used as stand alone solutions for a large scale
deployment. Furthermore, there are several issues that prevent the local deployment model to be
used at large scales.
One of these issues is that, although the single rendezvous server can not have access to any
of the user profiles, it would be able to compute the social graph and derive all the relationships
between users. This violates our need to know basis approach. More importantly, the single ren-
dezvous server would be a huge vulnerability since the entire OSN will be dysfunctional if it goes
down. Finally, unauthorized access to the rendezvous server’s database can potentially compro-
mise user securities as the attacker would have complete access to user connection information.
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These issues motivate our design to employ a structured peer to peer system comprising of only
the rendezvous servers using chord DHT[26]. The main reason that we are using chord is because
of its simple implementation, its reasonably good performance compared to the other solutions[14]
and some of its inherent features that will be used to prevent different attacks as will be described
later in chapter 7.
Before we describe our extended design we give a brief description of chord DHT and its
properties. Chord uses an overlay network that is shaped as a ring. Chord is designed only to
lookup a key and return the value that is responsible for the key. The key can be a filename that is
stored on a machine and the value would be the IP address of the machine that hosts the filename.
In our case, the key is the username of the peer and the value is the IP address of the rendezvous
server that the user should register with.
The key and the value are both mapped into the same domain by use of consistent hashing (CH)
and the hashed values are called identifiers. Consistent hashing[18] has several good properties: 1)
With high probability the hash function balances the load i.e. all nodes receive roughly the same
number of keys, also, 2) with high probability, when an N’th node joins (or leaves) the network,
only an O(1/N) fraction of the keys are moved to a different location. This is clearly the minimum
necessary to maintain a balanced load.
The chord ring is structured so that a username X is registered on the rendezvous server Y if and
only if: CH(X) ≤ CH(Y ) and there are no rendezvous servers Z where CH(X) ≤ CH(Z) ≤
CH(Y ). Node Y is referred to as Successor(X).
Chord has the following characteristics:
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• The number of messages that need to be sent to maintain the correct routing table upon
leaving or joining the ring is O(log2N).
• Routing table at each node only needs to obtain information about O(logN) other nodes on
the DHT ring.
• A successful look up query can be done in O(logN) number of messages.
We are using two types of consistent hashing namely, SHA-1[20] and MD5[22], that would map
to the same space. This approach facilitates rendezvous server replication as well as the detection
of malicious rendezvous servers as will be explained in chapter 7. We refer the reader to [26]
for a complete description of how nodes join a chord ring, replicate data and maintain the correct
routing tables. We adapt the same procedures to construct and maintain a chord ring composed of
rendezvous servers as participating nodes.
We are assuming that a chord ring of rendezvous servers is already in place and a peer knows
the IP address of at least one of the nodes on the ring. This can be done, perhaps through a publicly
available website listing the IP addresses of some of these rendezvous servers. Figure xi shows the
slightly modified registration process with the rendezvous servers.
Instead of registering directly with a rendezvous server, peer u first, looks up the correct ren-
dezvous servers on the DHT ring that correspond to its SHA-1 and MD5 hashed username values.
Then, u registers with those rendezvous servers using the same procedure described in Figure vi.
Note that as mentioned before, the only function that chord supports, is the look up function which
returns the IP address of another node on the ring. Therefore, the added complexity in the global
deployment model is very minimal in terms of the changes needed on the peer side.
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Figure xi: Peer registration with rendezvous servers located on a chord ring.
Finally, a peer can locate another peer by first, finding its corresponding rendezvous servers
using a look up query on the chord ring and then, using the same process described in Figure vii to
obtain the connection information of the other peer as shown in Figure xii.
6.2 Application Layer
This section describes the application layer of MyZone that is implemented on top of the service
layer described in the previous section. The application layer provides the following functionali-
ties:
1. Implementing all the social networking features of MyZone.
2. Enforcing permission policies defined by users, for different elements of their profiles. These
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Figure xii: Peer look up process on chord ring.
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policies define read, write, or no access permissions, for each element of the profile.
The user may define these access permissions, per individual, or groups of users. This is
very similar to the concept of access control deployed in operating systems.
3. Profile replication on other devices to increase availability.
4. Finally, if a user agrees to serve as mirror for another user, the application layer needs to
support the first two functionalities for the mirrored profiles.
While the service layer is designed to overcome resiliency, connectivity, routing and most of
security challenges, the application layer needs to tackle availability, traffic optimization and power
management challenges described previously in 5.2.1 and 5.2.6. We explain how the application
layer would address these challenges as we describe the design. Before that we state all the features
of MyZone that are going to be supported by the application layer. Most of these features are
common on many social networking sites like Facebook and as a new competition are essential for
the success of MyZone. MyZone has the following features:
• Users can post links, status updates, video files (H.264 (.mp4, .mov, .f4v), FLV (.flv), 3GPP
(.3gp, .3g2), YouTube, vimeo), audio files (AAC (.aac, .m4a), MP3 (.mp3)) and photos
on their own profiles or their friends’ profiles. Any post can be deleted depending on the
permission policy in place for that post.
• Users can comment on, like or dislike any post.
• Users can create events and invite their friends.
• Users can send private messages to their friends.
48
• Users can assign their friends to customized Zones and share items with them exclusively.
There are two design choices when it comes to choosing the type of application client for My-
Zone: Desktop application or a Web application. A desktop application has several disadvantages
in comparison to a web application. It is usually platform dependent (although we are using Java in
our case), the user experience is going to be much different from that of ordinary social networking
sites due to lack of many web technologies on desktop applications. As a result the user interface
design will be difficult. Finally, developing future expansions for a web application is a lot easier
than for a desktop application. On the other hand the abundance of web technologies and their
flexibility would make web application a clear winner especially considering adding new features
to MyZone in future releases. Therefore, we have decided to design the application layer based on
a web application.
Profile information can be stored on the hard disk using a data base management system (DBMS)
or it can be stored in a series of files. Although using a database management system seems to be
a straightforward solution as the complexity of data retrieval is dumped on the dbms, using a dbms
can have its own disadvantages. The main disadvantage of using a dbms is that even though dbms
applications are optimized for queries on large set of data, frequent database queries can adversely
affect the performance substantially. In addition dbms applications are platform dependent and this
would require a user to preinstall an appropriate dbms on her machine before using our application
which is not desirable. Our application layer design uses its own data storage system that achieves
faster response time with less resource utilization while avoiding the need to use a separate dbms
application. All data are represented using Extensible Markup Language (XML). XML is a set of
rules for encoding documents in machine-readable form. It is widely used to represent arbitrary
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data structures. The simplicity, generality, and usability of XML, in addition to the wide range of
programming languages including web technologies that support it, has made it a perfect candidate
for our purposes.
In XML, data is represented using structured text files. XML text files are constructed as sets
of user defined XML elements. Each XML element is defined as a set of attributes and other
elements. In MyZone, every piece of information is mapped to either an attribute or an element
as will be explained later, but for now, we only suffice to mention that each queryable piece of
information has an id attribute that is unique and corresponds to the timestamp of the creation of
that element. To achieve fast queries, each element is stored in ascending order in its corresponding
XML file based on its id. Furthermore, to bound the time of a query each XML file only stores a
limited number of elements determined by an attribute as part of the client application’s settings.
When querying for a particular element first the correct XML file is loaded into memory and then
searched for the element with the correct id. Finding the correct file is done using a history log that
keeps track of three items for each XML file: The id of the very first element stored in that file, the
id of the very last element stored in that file and finally the number of items stored in the file. The
history log itself is stored as an XML file as well.
To conserve traffic, the application layer uses a pulling scheme to distribute updates among
users. This means that if two users A and B are friends with each other, A’s client application pe-
riodically tries to establish a connection to a device that is hosting B’s profile and upon successful
connection, download the latest profile updates of B to A’s device. Upon every successful update
session on B’s profile, A’s client application records the timestamp as the last update time for B.
In order to optimize traffic, each update session for B’s profile initiated by A’s client application
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will precede by A’s client application sending out the last successful update time for B’s profile
to B’s hosting device. The hosting device would then compute B’s latest profile updates for A by
combining all the updated elements of B’s profile since the last successful update time at A’s client
application in a temporary XML file and sending it to A’s client application. This method clearly
results in minimum traffic as each piece of profile update is transmitted as part of one and only one
successful update session per friendship.
Avoiding retransmission of profile contents for each friend comes at the cost of storing friends’
profiles locally. This means that at some point the client application may run out of storage for
friends’ profiles. As a measure to avoid this, the client application would store each of friends’
profiles under a directory named after each friend’s username in another directory appropriately
named as friends. The friends directory has a restricted size, set as part of the client application’s
settings referred to as cache size. The application layer would fill the friends directory with friends’
profile contents until the cache size capacity is reached. At that point, latest profile updates will
replace the oldest profile updates stored in the friends directory. In case a user wishes to access
a friend’s profile content that has already been deleted from the friends directory, the appropriate
request will be sent to the hosting device of that friend and the requested profile content will be
retransmitted to the client application. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between the storage and the
traffic: as the cache size shrinks the amount of traffic due to retransmission of deleted profile
content would increase.
As mentioned at the start of this section, one feature of MyZone is that users can assign their
friends to customized Zones and share items with them exclusively. What this means, is that a
user can create different zones e.g. close friends, colleagues, family, etc., and assign her friends to
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different zones. These zone can be overlapping which means a friend can be assigned to several
zones. When a friend is added, the client application automatically adds the new friend to a default
zone called All. For every content a user posts on her profile the corresponding XML element has
a sharedWith attribute that implicitly dictates the read and write permissions of other friends for
that content. Unless the content is shared with All zone, it will be only visible to members of the
zone it is shared with. Furthermore, each posted content can be liked, disliked, or commented on
by members of the zone that it is shared with. This feature provides more privacy to MyZone’s
users at the cost of more complexity especially when it comes to sending latest profile updates to
a friend X in which case of all the latest profile updates, those that are only visible to X should be
sent back. This task is computationally intensive and as will be shown in Chapter 9 it will have the
most adverse effect in the overall response time of the client application.
Finally and most importantly as was earlier discussed in 5.2.1, the application layer needs to
provide as much profile availability as possible when the client application is not connected. The
increased availability is provided by using replication at the application layer. There are different
design choices for replication. One solution is to replicate profiles on other devices either randomly
or by using a heuristic approach. This approach is dominantly being used in many peer to peer
systems such as bit torrent protocol and has proved to be very effective. But as we argued in 5.2.1,
this approach is not appropriate for MyZone due to the inherent nature of social networks and their
features. Therefore we have invented our own replication scheme for MyZone. Our replication
scheme will replicate user profiles on two classes of devices: devices that belong to the profile
owner and devices that belong to friends of the profile owner. The replication on the first set of
devices is referred to as self replication while replication on the second set of devices is labeled as
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social hosting. Social hosting is the concept of a friend accepting to be a mirror for another friend
based on her social ties with the original profile owner.
Based on the fact that social networks are formed on social ties, we believe that the process
of mirroring in the social network should also be based on social ties. Mirroring for another
user translates into allocating resources i.e. storage, cpu and bandwidth, on behalf of the user.
It also translates into a sense of trust by the user in the mirror as the mirrored profile content
includes sensitive information only available to friends. This sense of trust in addition to resource
allocation required by the mirror would make the mirroring not just a role but a responsibility for
the mirroring user. This sense of responsibility can only be created among friends and not just
any friend but those with stronger social ties to the original profile owner. Therefore we believe
that social hosting is a more appropriate and effective method of replication for peer to peer social
network applications such as MyZone.
Social hosting is not forced onto friends. This means that a friend may or may not accept to be
a mirror for another friend. This may cause a user not being able to obtain a mirror amongst her
friends. In addition, a friend may limit the amount of storage he is willing to allocate as a mirror
referred to as mirroring capacity as part of the mirror setting at any time. In this case a user may use
self replication to increase the availability of her profile without any constraints until she can find
an appropriate mirror. Self replication is done by assigning a priority to each device the user owns.
Let’s assume that the user X has three devices at her disposal: A desktop at her home, a laptop
that she uses at work and a tablet or smartphone that she carries with her all the time. Furthermore,
all of these devices have some connectivity to the internet, while the desktop has most resources
e.g. storage, power and cpu, the tablet has the least and the laptop is in between. User X can use
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all three devices to host her profile by assigning the highest priority to the desktop making it her
primary device, while making laptop her secondary and the tablet her tertiary devices. The device
priority is otherwise known as the rank of the device. All the requests for X’s profile are handled
by her desktop device first, and in case it is not online the laptop will handle the requests and
otherwise the tablet. Note that the device priority is based on its resources and not its connectivity.
When a higher priority device becomes online it will treat the lower priority devices as mirrors and
will periodically synchronize with them.
The rank of the device is generalized to social hosting as well. When a friend Y of user X
agrees to mirror for X , X will give a rank to Y . This rank can be a mixed function of X’s social
tie with Y , the resources that Y is allocating to mirror for X , and Y ’s connectivity. While X’s
devices are offline the requests for X’s profile are sent to her mirrors starting at the highest rank.
This means that if a higher ranked mirror is available the lower ranked mirror is not going to be
used.
After Y has agreed to be X’s mirror the most recent profile contents of X will be sent to
Y ’s device as part of initial synchronization. In case X’s profile size is larger than the allocated
capacity by Y , the mirroring space on Y is filled with the latest contents from X’s profile and the
old contents are not replicated. Upon successful initial synchronization, X would send out Y ’s
username and its mirroring rank as part of its registration information to the rendezvous server
as illustrated in Figure vi. The rendezvous server will store this information in its mirrors table
described in Figure x. This information will be distributed to all of X’s friend the next time that
anyone of them tries to locate X as illustrated in Figure vii.
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Figure xiii: Design architecture for the entire application layer.
When a friend of user X labeled as Z tries to connect to X’s profile it will send a locate
peer query to the rendezvous server with priority value of 0 to connect to X’s primary device.
Upon receiving the connection information, Z tries to connect to X’s primary device. In case X’s
primary device is unreachableZ sends out a locate query forX’s secondary device by incrementing
the priority value by one and repeats this process for the tertiary device in case the secondary device
is also offline. Note that in our design we have limited the self replication to only two devices which
means that a user can only have three devices associated with her MyZone profile and while a user
must have a primary device, having secondary and tertiary devices is optional. When all three
of X’s devices are unreachable, Z can get the most recent profile updates of X from her mirrors
starting at the highest ranked mirror. To locate user X’s rank i mirror, the value of priority sent as
part of locate peer query in step 1.1.1.1 of Figure vii is computed as i + 2 where the offset by 2 is
indicating that the device is a mirror.
Figure xiii summarizes all of our design choices in form of the application layer design archi-
tecture. As you can see the application layer has three major components: MyZone Engine, Web
Application, and shared classes. MyZone engine is the most crucial part of the application layer.
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It runs as a background process and is responsible for downloading all the latest profile updates
from friends, sending out all the contents posted by the user on friends’ profiles, synchronizing
with other replicas, and finally managing the storage capacity based on the limits set in the appli-
cation setting. It is essentially responsible for all the peer to peer transmissions as well as storage
management.
The web application provides a web based user interface for the application layer and is respon-
sible for both representing all the information stored as XML files in a more user friendly HTML
format and also converting all the posted contents and requests submitted by the user through the
web interface into XML files. Finally, shared classes component is composed of a set of classes
used as a toolbox by the other two components to convert the data between XML files and Java
classes.
As a peer to peer application, MyZone application layer needs to function both as a server when
dealing with requests from other peers and as a client when sending out requests to other peers.
Since MyZone engine is responsible for all the peer to peer transmissions, it will be responsible
for both the client and the server roles. We have separated these two roles into two subcomponents
of MyZone engine, namely, the client thread and the serving thread. As a result of implementing a
pulling scheme, the client thread is responsible for periodic download of the latest profile updates
from other friends. This task is implemented by the updating thread component of the client thread.
The client thread is also responsible for sending out the contents posted by the user on her friends’
profiles to corresponding hosting devices. The posting thread component of the client thread is
in charge of this task. Finally, the client thread is responsible for periodic synchronization of the
user’s latest profile updates with her mirrors. This is done by first receiving all the latest updates
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from the mirrors starting at the highest ranked mirror, merging those updates with the current
profile and finally, sending out the updated profile to the mirrors. The syncing thread component
of the client thread implements the mirror synchronization task.
The serving thread has the same responsibilities as the client thread but in the reverse role. This
means that upon receiving a request for profile updates from a friend, the serving thread is re-
sponsible for computing the latest profile updates that need to be sent to that friend. This involves
bundling all the latest profile changes based on their shareWith attributes and the requester’s mem-
bership in different zones which as mentioned earlier is the most computationally intensive task on
the client application. The send updates component of the serving thread is in charge of this task.
The serving thread is also responsible for receiving and storing the updates posted by other friends
on the user’s profile. The receive updates component of the serving thread implements this.
Finally, upon receiving a synchronization request from a mirrored profile owner, the serving
thread is responsible for sending back all the latest updates of the mirrored profile and receiving the
latest version of the mirrored profile from the original user. The synchronization is implemented
by the syncing thread component of the serving thread. Note that the send updates and the receive
updates components of the serving thread handle received requests for mirrored profiles as well.
The client thread and the serving thread components of MyZone engine use the service layer to
implement their tasks. Finally the cleaner component of the serving thread is responsible for
storage management of both friends’s directory and all the mirrored profiles.
As noted earlier, the web application component of the application layer is responsible for
representing all the information stored on XML files to the user through web interfaces. The web
application layer needs a web server to provide the web interfaces. We have chosen the Jetty
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web server for our design since it is java based which makes it platform independent. To convert
XML files into web pages we use JavaServer Pages (JSP) technology which is supported by Jetty
as well. The JSP code uses the classes in the shared class component of the application layer
to convert XML files into web pages. The user can view, modify or create new content using
the web interface. One advantage of using JSP and XML technologies to implement the web
application is that future modifications to MyZone will be a lot easier to implement. In addition,
the use of JSP makes the implementation of the web interface a lot easier since JSP code can easily
reuse the already implemented Java classes in the shared classes component. In Section 8.2 the
implementation of the application layer will be described in more detail.
7 Security Measures
In section 6.1 we described the design of the service layer without considering security attacks. In
this chapter we explain the possible security attacks, the scenarios that implement them, and the
measures taken to detect, prevent, and recover from these attacks. Furthermore, we modify the
design of the service layer to incorporate these measures. We start by identifying all the security
attacks that apply to our peer to peer OSN environment and defining the scenarios that implement
them. Then, we describe a modified peer registration process for the global deployment model,
that embodies our security measures. Finally we explain how the design handles the attacks.
The adversary model was defined earlier in 4.2.2 where we described the malicious entities,
their resources and the types of attacks that they can implement. Here, we further categorize the
adversaries into three groups:
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1. Those that try to hijack user information i.e. profile, friend list, etc.
2. Those that try to isolate particular peers, or groups of peers from other users.
3. Those that try to make the system unresponsive by attacking its server components.
As a reminder from earlier, we state that a malicious node can be any component of the system
with the exception of the certificate authority. This essentially means that any rendezvous or relay
server or peer can be malicious2. Note that these assumptions only apply to the global deployment
model, as opposed to the local deployment model where the goal of constructing a private OSN
would require the components to be trustworthy.
In addition, any malicious node can choose selectively to act correctly or maliciously towards
other components. Based on these assumptions any attack that attempts to use impersonation e.g.
man in the middle, spoofing, eavesdropping etc. will not be a concern since we assume that all
components of the system with the exception of the certificate authority and friends are not trusted.
However, the design uses a decentralized technique that detects and isolates the malicious entities
over time, as will be explained later on.
7.1 Security Attacks and Scenarios
The security attacks that apply to our model and their corresponding scenarios are:
• Sybil attacks: an attacker creates a large number of identities and dominates the overlay
network by fooling the protocols, and subverting mechanisms based on redundancy.
Scenario:
2As mentioned earlier in 4.2.1, a peer would not act maliciously towards its own friends
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– S.1) A malicious node creates virtual rendezvous servers and tries to take over a partic-
ular key (username) or pollute the routing tables of the other rendezvous servers.
• Eclipse attacks also known as routing table poisoning: an attacker controls a sufficient
fraction of the neighbors of a node, hence the node can be eclipsed. This kind of attack
applies to network proximity based DHTs like Pastry[23] and Tapestry[32] and is very hard
to achieve in Chord.
Scenario:
– E.1) A set of malicious rendezvous servers try to target (eclipse) a particular correct
rendezvous server by poisoning the routing tables of other rendezvous servers.
• Routing attacks: an attacker may do a combination of the following:
– Refuse to forward a lookup request.
– It may forward it to an incorrect, non-existing, or malicious node.
– It may pretend to be the node responsible for the key.
Scenarios:
– R.1, R.2, R.3) Malicious rendezvous servers do one or some combination of the above,
on a locate rendezvous server request shown in Figure xi.
• Storage attacks: a node routes requests correctly, but denies the existence of a valid key or
provides invalid data as response. This attack can be in conjunction with the routing table
attack.
Scenario:
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– T.1) A rendezvous server returns incorrect information in response to a locate peer
request.
7.2 Security Measures
Now that we have defined the security attacks and their corresponding scenarios, we can introduce
the modified peer registration process. This modification only applies to the global deployment
model that uses chord DHT. Figure xiv shows the overall registration process in the global deploy-
ment model.
The process is modified to reflect the fact that although the peers initially assume that the ren-
dezvous servers are acting correctly, they don’t trust them until their behaviors are verified by
another trusted entity. Rendezvous server X corresponds to the initial rendezvous server Rk in
Figure xi, while Y and Z correspond to the rendezvous servers assumed to be responsible for
MD5 and SHA-1 hashed username values respectively.
The modified process is executed before peer i registers with the rendezvous servers. Using this
process peer i can verify if Y and Z are really responsible for its keys, or if they are malicious
nodes trying to take over i. The process is summarized in Algorithm i.
Algorithm i is a randomized algorithm and can only be used after user i is friend with at least
one other user. Next, we analyze Algorithm i and provide a formula that computes the expected
number of runs for a successful registration.
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Y Z 
1. LocateRendezvousServers (MD5(j), SHA1(j)) 
Peer i!
Chord Ring 
R or S  
or R = S 
T or U  
or T = U 
Peer j!
2. T = MD5(j) , U = SHA1(j) 2. R = MD5(j) , S = SHA1(j) 
1. LocateRendezvousServers (MD5(j), SHA1(j)) 
3. LocatePeer (j), 4. CI(j) 3. LocatePeer (j), 4. CI(j) 
X 
5. LocateRendezvousServers 
(MD5(i), SHA1(i)) 
5. LocateRendezvousServers 
(MD5(i), SHA1(i)) 
6. A = MD5(i), B = SHA1(i) 6. A = MD5(i), B = SHA1(i) 
Figure xiv: The modified peer registration process for the global deployment model.
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Algorithm i Modified registration process.
1: randomly choose a rendezvous server X .
2: (Y, Z) = X.LocateRendezvousServers(MD5(i), SHA− 1(i));
3: for all friends j of i do
4: (R, S) = Y.LocateRendezvousServers(MD5(j), SHA−1(j)); // steps 1 and 2 in Figure
xiv.
5: (T, U) = Z.LocateRendezvousServers(MD5(j), SHA−1(j)); // steps 1 and 2 in Figure
xiv.
6: (CIj(R)) = R.LocatePeer(j); // steps 3 and 4 in Figure xiv. CIj(R) denotes the connec-
tion information for peer j obtained from rendezvous server R.
7: (CIj(S)) = S.LocatePeer(j); // steps 3 and 4 in Figure xiv
8: (CIj(T )) = T.LocatePeer(j); // steps 3 and 4 in Figure xiv
9: (CIj(U)) = U.LocatePeer(j); // steps 3 and 4 in Figure xiv
10: if i.ConnectTo(CIj(R)) 6= false‖i.ConnectTo(CIj(S)) 6=
false‖i.ConnectTo(CIj(T )) 6= false‖i.ConnectTo(CIj(U)) 6= false then // At
least one of the connection information was correct and a connection has been successfully
established to j.
11: (A,B) = D.LocateRendezvousServers(MD5(i), SHA − 1(i)); // steps 5 and 6 in
Figure xiv. D ∈ {R, S, T, U} where the correct CIj was obtained from.
12: if A == Y then
13: i registers with rendezvous server Y ;
14: else
15: i marks Y and X as potentially malicious nodes and goes to line 1;
16: end if
17: if B == Z then
18: i registers with rendezvous server Z;
19: return; // terminates.
20: else
21: i marks Z and X as potentially malicious nodes and goes to line 1;
22: end if
23: end if
24: end for
25: goto line 1;
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7.2.1 Analysis of Algorithm i
Algorithm i runs until three trusted rendezvous servers are found in which case it terminates at line
19. There are three cases where the algorithm repeats itself. These cases correspond to lines 15, 21
and 25. The first two cases i.e. lines 15 and 21 correspond to scenarios where rendezvous serversX
and either Y or Z (depending on whether line 15 or 21 is executed) are detected as malicious while
line 25 is executed only if none of i’s friends are online. Therefore, each unsuccessful execution
of Algorithm i by peer i is either due to none of its friends being online or selecting a malicious
rendezvous server at line 1.
As successive runs of Algorithm i detect malicious rendezvous servers, they will be marked and
removed from the pool of candidate rendezvous servers at line 1. Therefore, this algorithm will
eventually terminate assuming that at least one of i’s friends are online and there are at least three
non malicious rendezvous servers.
To analyze the algorithm mathematically, we introduce the following notations:
• n: Denotes i’s total number of friends.
• m: Denotes the number of malicious rendezvous servers present.
• r: Denotes the total number of rendezvous servers present.
• pon: Denotes the probability that a friend of i is online. For simplicity, we are assuming that
this probability is the same for all friends of i which in general is not true.
A run of Algorithm i is successful if at least one friend of i is online and the three rendezvous
serversX , Y and Z are non-malicious. Only a malicious rendezvous server returns other malicious
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rendezvous servers therefore the chances that all three or at least two of the rendezvous servers are
malicious translates into the probability of X being a malicious rendezvous servers. Based on this
observation, the probability that the first run of Algorithm i terminates in successful registration is
computed as:
P1(Success) = pon(1− mr )
Consecutively, the probability that the first run of Algorithm i is unsuccessful is:
P1(Failure) = 1− P1(Success)
The probability of termination on the second run is the same as failure on the first run and
success on the second run. This means that either none of i’s friends were online or that two
malicious rendezvous servers were detected on the first run, in which case in the second run, they
will be excluded from the selection process at line 1. The probability of successful registration on
the second run is therefore:
P2(Success) = P1(Failure)pon(1− m−2r )
Respectively, the probability of failure on the second run is computed as:
P2(Failure) = 1− P2(Success)
Based on the above, a generalized formula for the n’th successful run after n − 1 failures is
derived as follows:
Pn(Success) =
∏n−1
i=1 Pi(Failure)(1− MAX(0,m−2(n−1))r )
Finally the expected number of runs of Algorithm i for a successful registration can be derived
from the above probability distribution function which is based on the number of friends if i, as well
as the total number of rendezvous servers and malicious rendezvous servers present on the DHT
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ring. Next, we explain how the overall design addresses different attack scenarios by prevention,
detection, and recovery techniques.
7.2.2 Prevention
Out of attack scenarios described in 7.1, there are three scenarios that are prevented by our design:
• A malicious node targets a particular peer to either render the user unreachable by DDoS
attack or hijack information from the user.
Solution: This requires the attacker having access to the user connection information. The
connection information can be obtained in two ways: sending the correct passphrase of the
user to the rendezvous server responsible for the target user, or through registering with a
malicious rendezvous server.
The passphrases are only shared with friends that are all trusted and will not act maliciously.
Furthermore, targeting a specific peer by a malicious rendezvous server is very unlikely due
to the key distribution properties of consistent hashing[18].
Even if a malicious node somehow obtains the connection information of the peer, although
a DDoS attack is feasible, unauthorized access to the user information is prevented. This
is because, the connection is encrypted using symmetric encryption and the process used to
exchange the session key uses keys from both parties.
The key exchange process ensures that the session key is encrypted by the sending party, in a
manner, that it can only be decrypted by the receiving party. This, guarantees authentication
and integrity at the same time, preventing man in the middle and impersonation attacks. In
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addition, connections from non-friend peers are refused.
• S.1) A malicious node creates virtual rendezvous servers and tries to take over a specific user
or pollute the rendezvous server tables to target that user.
Solution: the consistent hashing guarantees the balanced distribution of the identifiers. Con-
sequentially, although an attacker can create a lot of malicious virtual rendezvous servers, it
can only take over a specific user x, if it can predict the IP address of Successor(x). This
requires the malicious user to be able to reverse the consistent hashing function which is
known to be hard.
• E.1) A set of malicious rendezvous servers try to bypass (eclipse) a particular correct ren-
dezvous server by poisoning the routing tables of other rendezvous servers.
Solution: Although this attack is not explicitly prevented, it is effective only in DHTs that
are based on network proximity and does not apply to chord[29]. Furthermore, the two
independent identifiers for each username i.e. MD5 and SHA-1, would very likely result in
two independent paths to two different rendezvous servers. This makes eclipse attacks even
less effective.
7.2.3 Detection
Our design would be able to successfully detect the following attack scenarios as explained below:
• R.1) Malicious rendezvous server refuses to forward a locate rendezvous server request.
Solution: The peer tries to find another rendezvous server from a list of publicly available
rendezvous servers until it receives a reply.
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• R.2, R.3) Initial malicious rendezvous server X returns malicious nodes Y and Z in re-
sponse to LocateRendezvousServers(MD5(i),SHA-1(i)) sent by peer i in the initial stage
of registration.
Solution: Malicious behavior at the registration stage is detected using lines 15 and 21 of
Algorithm i.
• T.1) A rendezvous server returns incorrect information in response to a locate peer request.
Solution: Incorrect registration information can be identified by comparing the hash value
computed over IP +Port+ . . . with the signed hash value i.e. E(Qpeer)[IP +Port+ . . . ]
introduced in section 6.1.
This mechanism can also be used by rendezvous servers to detect malicious rendezvous
servers upon replication of data. This is done by each rendezvous server, verifying the
authenticity and integrity of the registration information that it receives from other servers,
before replicating it. If a rendezvous server receives a modified registration information, it
will not forward or replicate it.
7.2.4 Recovery
The biggest part of recovery is to isolate the malicious rendezvous servers after detection. The
malicious rendezvous servers are removed by a collaborative decision making that uses a reputation
based scheme. There are two ways to detect a malicious node: At the time of peer registration as
described earlier, and After registration.
Peer i can detect malicious behavior of rendezvous server X responsible for i, by receiving no-
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tifications from its friends who received incorrect or out of date registration information from X , in
response to locatePeer(i) queries. Note that in this scenario, X has behaved correctly during
the initial registration process otherwise i would not have registered with X from the beginning.
Peer i would send a complaint to a correct rendezvous server found in lines 13 and 18 of Algo-
rithm i. The complaint is spread on the chord ring and is recorded by the nodes that have an entry
for X in their routing tables.
Server X would be removed from the chord ring, only if the ring receives enough distinct
complaints specifically from peers that are registered with X . The distinct complaints are required
in order to prevent malicious peers from sending out falsified complaints, hence, removing a correct
rendezvous server.
If the received complaints regardingX are not enough, the servers on the chord ring would agree
not to isolate X , as it will be considered more beneficial than harmful. The benefit is the result of
selective malicious behavior of X towards peers. Respectively, peer i would send a complaint only
if it receives enough number of notifications from its friends. If these notifications are few, peer i
concludes that the benefit of X still outdoes its harm.
The complaint sent by any peer need to be authenticated. This means that the entire complaint
needs to be signed by the peer and it should include a timestamp to prevent duplicated complaints.
The described scheme is designed to impose the following restrictions:
1. A malicious rendezvous server should not be able to complain about a correct rendezvous
server and only a peer registered with the rendezvous server should be able to complain
about it.
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2. A malicious peer can only complain about its own rendezvous server and only once. There-
fore, if r is the minimum number of complaints that are needed to exclude a node from the
ring, then r of these malicious peers need to register with the same rendezvous server to
remove a specific rendezvous server.
3. A peer can falsely believe that her rendezvous servers are malicious, only if her friends
intentionally send notifications to her. This would result in unreachability of the peer and
would violate the assumption that a peer would not act as adversary to her own friends.
7.3 Discussion of Security Limitations
In this section we point out the limitations of our design in dealing with some of the security attack
scenarios. As we pointed out earlier, we are assuming that a user never acts maliciously against
one of her friends. This was defined as trust as a friend earlier. Therefore, if a user’s profile is
compromised by perhaps a take over of the account, our design will not be able to prevent any
kind of attack initiated by a friend. Hence, all friends of a compromised friend are at potential risk
until they somehow are notified at which point they will delete the user from their friends’ list. As
a possible solution to this limitation we can create a panic button that will notify all the friends
of a compromised user and will delete all her information. However the panic button can only be
used if the user is expecting her profile to be compromised and has the opportunity to use the panic
button.
Another limitation of our approach is the fact that it does not provide anonymity to the users.
Unlike anonymous P2P network infrastructures such as Tor [12], our approach does not protect
the identity of its users against malicious monitoring entities. One example of this is when a
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malicious entity is providing a relay service to the users. In this case all parties using the relay
server are identified by the malicious relay server, however, all communications remain encrypted
and protected between all pairs of users. Therefore, even though the malicious entities can find the
identities of some of the users they are never able to find the nature of their communications and
can never recover any of the information that was transferred between them.
Finally, if a malicious entity blocks access to the certificate authority e.g. by implementing a
DDoS attack or filtering the traffic, no new users can join the social network. In case of a traffic
filtering approach we can employ out of band issuance and delivery of certificates using mail
servers but in case of a DDoS attack the system will temporarily be incapable of accepting new
users until the DDoS attack is stopped.
8 Implementation
We described the design of MyZone in Chapters 6 and 7. In this chapter we provide more details
on the implementation of MyZone by describing the code components, interfaces and classes that
implement the service layer and the application layer. As mentioned earlier, to achieve platform
independence, the implementation is all done in Java and JSP.
8.1 Service Layer Implementation
In this section, we explain the structure of our service layer code and define the interfaces provided
by each component. As described earlier in section 6.1, the service layer includes five types of
components, namely, Certificate Authority, Relay, Rendezvous and STUN Servers and the peer.
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The corresponding Java code for the service layer, is structured in a way that reflects the separation
of these entities. As shown in Figure xv, the overall view of the service layer code lays out four
different packages:
• servers: Which includes the implementation of the four server components of the service
layer, each in a separate package.
• net: Which implements a secure socket over both UDP and TCP. This package includes Se-
cureSocket and rudp packages. rudp package implements reliable UDP. The SecureSocket
package implements a secure socket over TCP and reliable UDP, while its sub package Re-
laySocket, implements a relayed secure socket.
• security: Which implements security utilities needed by the other components.
• peer: Which implements the services available to peers as part of the interface used by
MyZone engine in the application layer.
Figure xvi, xvii and xviii describe net, RendezvousServer and peer packages in more detail
using UML class diagrams. The net package includes the rudp and SecureSocket packages. The
rudp package is implemented using two classes: The ReliableSocket class implements a reliable
datagram client socket using the standard datagram socket provided by Java. The ReliableServer-
Socket class implements a reliable datagram server socket using the ReliableSocket class.
The SecureSocket package is composed of TLSClientSocket, TLSServerSocket, and Secure-
Socket classes and RelaySocket package. The TLSClientSocket and TLSServerSocket implement
client and server side TLS like secure sockets respectively. The main functionalities of these two
classes is to perform the certificate and session key exchanges required as part of TLS handshake.
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Upon successful exchange of the session key, a SecureSocket class is instantiated by each of
these classes. The SecureSocket class performs send and receive functionalities, while encrypting
all transmitted data using the exchanged session key. The RelaySocket package implements the
same functionalities as TLSClientSocket and TLSServerSocket but specifically for a relayed con-
nection. As mentioned earlier, the relayed connection is an end to end secure connection and can
not be decrypted by the relay server.
The RendezvousServer package includes the rendezvousServer class that implements the func-
tionalities of the rendezvous server. The db class implements the database driver needed by the
RendezvousServer class to communicate with the rendezvous server database. The other classes
are used to store data for peer, relay server and friendship requests.
Finally, the peer package implements all the functionalities available to peers using the peer
class. The peer class uses discoverNat to discover the type of NAT that the peer is behind, and
stores this information in the discoveryInfo class. As for the RendezvousServer package, all the
other classes are used to represent optional data. Tables i, and ii define all the interfaces for each
of the components.
8.2 Application Layer Implementation
In this section we explain how our design architecture for the application layer, shown in Figure
xiii is implemented. As we described in 6.2, the application layer has three major components,
namely, the MyZone Engine, the web application and the shared classes. Figure xix shows all the
classes that implement the application layer and their relationships with each other in form of a
UML class diagram.
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Figure xv: Overall view of all the composing packages of the service layer and their relationships.
Figure xvi: Class diagram for the net package.
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Figure xvii: Class diagram for the RendezvousServer package.
Figure xviii: Class diagram for the peer package.
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Figure xix: Class diagram for the entire application layer.
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The class diagram can be viewed as having three separate components corresponding to those
in the application layer design. The main class in the MyZone Engine component shown at the top,
is MyZoneEngine which is composed of two subclasses: servingThread and clientThread. The
two subclasses correspond to the two subcomponents of the MyZone Engine component. Note
that during the entire lifetime of MyZone engine there exists only one instance of these classes.
The clientThread class has three subclasses each implementing one of the three tasks that the
clientThread class is responsible for, as described in 6.2. These three subclasses use the shared
classes in order to operate on data stored in form of XML files.
The servingThread has only one subclass called server. For each request received at the serv-
ing socket instantiated in the servingThread class, an instance of server class is created to handle
the request based on its type. The three functions, sync, receiveUpdates, and sendUpdates are
responsible for synchronization with an original device, posting updates and sending updates re-
quests respectively. At the end of serving a request, the server class calls the cleaner class which
manages the storage by deleting the oldest files in case the maximum set capacity has reached.
The web application component in Figure xiii is implemented using two packages: The Jetty
web server and the JSP files. The Jetty web server is an open source web server completely written
in Java and supports JSP files. Each JSP file in the JSP package implements a single web interface
in form of a dynamic web page. The index.jsp file represents the news feeds for different zones
and the user can use this interface to like, dislike, or comment on any content shown on her news
feed (Figure xx). The profile.jsp file converts all the profile information of a user stored as XML
files, to a web page. The user can use the provided interface to post contents on her own profile
or a friend’s profile (Figure xxi). The messages.jsp file converts all the private messages sent to
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the user from XML format to a web page. It also provides the required web interfaces for the user
to compose private messages to her friends (Figure xxii). The events.jsp file is responsible for
representation, as well as modification and creation of events (Figure xxiii). The friends.jsp file
shows the list of all friends and enables the user to delete a friend, send a request for friendship
and accept or deny a received friendship request (Figure xxiv). The mirrors.jsp file (Figure xxv)
shows all the settings related to mirrors and provides the following functionalities to the user:
• Sending mirroring requests to other friends.
• Accept or deny received mirroring requests.
• Delete a user from the list of mirrors.
• Change the rank of a mirror.
• Refuse to mirror a particular friend.
• Change the allocated storage for mirroring a particular friend.
Finally, settings.jsp displays all the settings for the client application and provides the interface
to modify all the setting attributes listed in Table iii (Figure xxvi). In addition it provides the
interface to manage zones, enabling users to create, delete or modify the members of a zone (Figure
xxvii). Since all data is stored in XML files, all the JSP files use shared classes in order to operate
on the XML files. The shared classes component acts as a toolkit for MyZone engine and web
application components. The shared classes package includes a package called elements. This
package has a corresponding class for every XML element used in MyZone and each class is
primarily responsible for converting the XML elements to Java objects and vice versa.
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Figure xx: A snapshot of the web interfaces implemented by index.jsp.
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Figure xxi: A snapshot of the web interfaces implemented by profile.jsp.
Figure xxii: A snapshot of the web interfaces implemented by messages.jsp.
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Figure xxiii: A snapshot of the web interfaces implemented by events.jsp.
Figure xxiv: A snapshot of the web interfaces implemented by friends.jsp.
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Figure xxv: A snapshot of the web interfaces implemented by mirrors.jsp.
Figure xxvi: A snapshot of the web interfaces implemented by settings.jsp.
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Figure xxvii: A snapshot of the web interfaces implemented by settings.jsp that manages the zones.
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Table iii: MyZone setting attributes for the application layer.
Setting Attribute Description
Number of entries per
wall session
This number indicates the maximum number of profile contents
represented as xml elements stored in one xml file as explained
in section 6.2 and needs to be between 100 and 1000. As this
number grows, the number of XML files decreases while the in-
dividual file sizes increase making searching within a file slower.
The default value for this attribute is 100.
Rendezvous Server Ad-
dress
The IP address of the rendezvous server that the client needs to
register with.
Rendezvous Server
Port
The port number for the rendezvous server that the client needs to
register with.
STUN Server Address The IP address of the STUN server.
STUN Server Port The port number for the STUN server.
MyZone Server Port The local port number that MyZone engine is listening on for re-
quests from other peers.
MyZone Cache Size The limit on the size of the friends directory where all friends’
profiles are stored in.
Priority of this device This attribute indicates whether the current device is primary, sec-
ondary or tertiary.
Synchronization period This attribute indicates how often this device should synchronize
with lower priority devices and other mirrors. A smaller period
results in more frequent synchronizations which translates into
more traffic while a larger period results in more inconsistent pro-
file images on mirrors as synchronization is done less frequently.
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After describing the code structure of the application layer in terms of its composing classes
and their relationships, we proceed to explain how data is managed in the application layer. Data
in MyZone can be categorized into three groups:
• Client application settings.
• User specific data.
• Profile information.
With the exception of the client application settings, all data are stored under a directory named
after the username of the device owner. The client application settings are described in Table iii
and stored in settings.xml. Table v in Appendix A describes the XML schema of settings.xml.
The user specific data is composed of the following items:
• User mirroring information which includes the list of mirrors stored in mirrors.xml, the list
of mirrored users stored in originals.xml and the lists of sent mirroring requests and received
mirroring requests stored in sentMirroringRequests and receivedMirroringRequests.xml
respectively. Table vi in Appendix A describes the XML schema of the mirror element.
• List of friends, received friendship requests and sent friendship requests stored in friends.xml,
awaitingFriendships.xml and pendingFriendships.xml. Table vii describes the XML schema
of the friend element.
• List of all passphrases. Each passphrase corresponds to a unique friendship. The list of
passphrases is stored in passphrases.xml and Table viii in Appendix A describes the XML
schema of the passphrase entry element.
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• List of all zones and their settings including members of each zone stored in zones.xml.
Table ix in Appendix A describes the schema of the zone element.
• List of all files that make up the correct file system image stored in correctImage.xml. Each
entry in this list includes the filename and its size as described in Table x in Appendix A.
There are two kinds of files that are included in correctImage.xml: The files that belong to
friends’ profiles which are considered as part of cache storage, and the files that belong to
the device owner’s profile or other mirrored profiles.
• List of all files that make up the existing file system image stored in existingImage.xml.
Each entry in this list is similar to those in correctImage.xml. The cleaner thread computes
the correct image and manages the storage by deleting all the files for entries that are only in
existingImage.xml and not in the correctImage.xml.
The profile information can also be divided into three groups based on the ownership of profile,
namely, the device owner, the mirrored users, and friends. The profile information is composed of
the following items:
• Information about the user stored in info.xml. This includes both basic information as well
as employment and education history which are optional. Table xi in Appendix A describes
the XML schema of the elements in info.xml.
• User events including both the events she has created and those that she is invited to which
are stored in events.xml. Table xii in Appendix A describes the XML schema of the event
element
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• Sent and received private messages stored in outbox.xml and inbox.xml respectively. Table
xiii in Appendix A describes the XML schema of a message element. The sent and received
private messages are encrypted using the private key of the sender and the public key of the
receiver and are safe to be stored on mirrored devices as they can not be decrypted by anyone
except the intended receiver.
• Profile entries as posts. The entries can be status updates or message posts which we refer
to as wall posts, as well as links, photos, audios, and videos. The user can organize photo,
audio, and video posts as albums. Tables xiv, xv, xvi, xvii and xviii in Appendix A describe
the XML schemas for profile entries. Note that each element has three sub elements that
correspond to likes, dislikes and comments posted on that profile entry. As each of these
profile entries may be deleted by its owner at some point, we use an XML element called
deletedEntry in order to keep track of deleted entries. Table xix in Appendix A describes the
XML schema of a deletedEntry element.
• Finally, all the profile entries posted on another friend’s profile are initially stored in pend-
ingChanges.xml and are removed upon successful submission by the postingThread of the
clientThread. Table xx in Appendix A describes the XML schema of the pendingChange
element.
All of the above items are stored for the device owner’s profile whereas for a mirrored profile the
pending changes are not stored and for friends’ profiles only the profile entries are stored locally.
This concludes our overview of the implementation of MyZone which includes over seventeen
thousands lines of code for the service layer and just under thirty thousands lines of code for
the application layer excluding the Jetty web server. In the next chapter we evaluate the local
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deployment of MyZone with respect to availability, scalability and resource utilization.
9 Evaluation
Earlier in section 5.2, we identified the challenges that a peer to peer social network faces. Further-
more, we explained how our design addresses those challenges in chapters 6, 7 and 8. While we
theoretically showed how our design handles resiliency, routing, connectivity and security chal-
lenges, we did not produce any evidence of its effectiveness addressing availability and traffic
optimization challenges.
In this chapter we evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed design in handling these challenges
based on three aspects: Profile availability, Resource utilization and Scalability. Unless our design
shows superior performance in all three aspects, it will not be able to successfully compete with ex-
isting centralized social networks. That is why in this chapter we thoroughly evaluate these aspects
of MyZone using both real world deployment and emulation. We first describe our experimental
setup, then we present the results of our experiments based on these aspects.
9.1 Experimental setup
In this section we describe our experimental setup. We ran a local deployment of MyZone for
40 days among a population of 104 subjects. Our subjects were chosen from undergraduate and
graduate students in computer related fields in such a way that almost all of them were already
friends with each other. The reason that we selected our subjects from those who are existing
friends of one another is that we wanted to have a very realistic notion of social hosting. We
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provided a rendezvous server, and STUN server for the experiment in addition to 20 relay servers
each capable of handling 20 concurrent connections. Our relay servers were able to handle at most
200 concurrent users since each user using our relay server will require two connections to our
relay server: one busy connection for each received request and one idle connection acting as a
socket listening for new requests. The combined network bandwidth for our relay servers was 24
Mbps.
The client applications were programed to accommodate data logging using a very simple log-
ging mechanism. For each interaction initiated by the client in the client thread the application
would create a single line in the log file that included the following information:
1. Timestamp of the beginning of the session in milliseconds.
2. Type of the action: Posting on another friends profile or Getting updates from them.
3. The hash value of the username of the target friend. Hash values are used to anonymize the
logging data.
4. The hash value of the username serving for the target friend. The hash value is similar to the
previous one in case the connection is established to the device that belongs to the profile
owner and it is different in case the connection is established to a mirroring friend of the
original profile owner.
5. Number of bytes sent and received during this session.
6. Status of the current session: Connection established, Connection not established, Success-
fully/Unsuccessfully received updates and Successfully/Unsuccessfully sent posts.
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7. Timestamp at the end of the session in milliseconds.
The above log information are minimal and at the same time enough for us to analyze our
system comprehensively. The client applications were configured to register with the rendezvous
server every 2 minutes and send their logs to the rendezvous server at the time of registration.
The already sent log files are going to be deleted from the client application in order to prevent
overhead in the traffic. All the log files for each individual user were appended and sorted based
on the timestamps of each entry and at the end of our experiment we had a 63 MB log file stored
on the rendezvous server.
Our subjects were scattered over different continents and timezones but most of them resided
in California. Figure xxviii shows the classification of our subjects based on their geographical
location and timezones. Before the start of our experiment we provided a video tutorial of MyZone
to our subjects so that they could get familiar with all the features and we also gave them a 5 day
grace period to set up their basic profile and add friends. Since our subjects were chosen from a
set of people that had real world friendship with each other, almost all of our subjects added each
other as their friends. Therefore by the start of our experiment the social graph was already formed
and it was an almost complete graph with 5117 edges and 104 nodes. Finally, in order to evaluate
MyZone under realistic loads we asked our subjects to duplicate their Facebook interactions on
MyZone for the duration of our experiment. In addition, we asked our subjects to create different
zones if they wanted to and set the value of refresh interval for each zone to that based on their
experience on Facebook. The average refresh interval reported by our subjects was 30 minutes
which meant that most of our subjects expected a new entry in their news feed approximately
every 30 minutes.
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(a) Timezone classification of subjects (b) Geographical classification of subjects
Figure xxviii: Classification of subjects based on Timezone and Location
In our experiment 93% of the subjects were behind symmetric firewalls which meant that they
had to use our relay servers in order to be able to receive connections while the remaining 7% used
routers that supported UDP hole punching. We recorded 200GB of traffic relayed over our servers
at the end of the last day of our experiment. Also, in order to measure the resiliency of MyZone
against DDoS attacks on the rendezvous server we brought down the rendezvous server at the
end of the 35th day of our experiment. Therefore, in the last 5 days of our experiment the client
applications did not have access to the rendezvous server to locate their friends. In the following
sections we explore MyZone with respect to Availability, Resource utilization and Scalability using
our experimental results and we evaluate its effectiveness based on each aspect.
9.2 Availability
Availability is a very important aspect of any distributed system. It directly affects user experience
and it is very crucial to the success of any such system. In a peer to peer social networking
application, availability is measured by how often a user profile is available. This aspect becomes
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important since churn is an intrinsic part of a peer to peer system and in fact most of the time users
may not be participating on the network. We have introduced social hosting and self replication in
section 6.2 to address this problem.
In this section we measure profile availability in MyZone and provide evidence indicating that
profile availability is dramatically increased using our mirroring schemes. We explore the profile
availability of MyZone from two aspects: Receiving profile updates from friends which we refer to
as update sessions and posting contents on friends’ profiles which we refer to as posting sessions.
The update sessions are initiated regularly based on the values of refresh intervals for each zone set
as part of MyZone client application’s zone setting and are responsible for getting the latest profile
updates for each friend. The posting sessions are initiated when a user is posting something on her
friend’s profile. As the update sessions are created on regular basis their numbers are much larger
than the number of posting sessions.
User profile is available when the machine that is hosting the profile is connected to the network.
Hence, network connectivity has a huge impact on profile availability. Network connectivity of a
user’s device varies by hour of the day. Therefore, we expect the availability to vary over a daily
usage and for this we measure the average availability of user profiles over a period of 24 hours
as well as the entire duration of our experiment. The average daily availability is computed over
the first 35 days of our experiment since we wanted to isolate the effects of the outage of the
rendezvous server from our results.
Figure xxix shows average numbers of successful update sessions for a 24 hour period starting
at midnight while Figure xxx plots the average success ratios computed by dividing number of suc-
cessful update sessions by the total number of sessions for the same period of time. Note that the
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times are based on US Mountain timezone. In Figure xxix average numbers of successful sessions
per hour have some variation while average numbers of unsuccessful sessions per hour are almost
constant. The variation in the average numbers of successful sessions is an indication of the vari-
ation in network connectivity of user devices since update sessions are initiated periodically based
on the refresh interval parameter of the zone setting. The almost constant numbers of unsuccessful
update sessions are explained by the fact that although devices have varied network connectivity
over a day, profile availability is not varied that much because when a user’s device goes offline
one of her mirrors takes over the responsibility of serving her friends.
Figure xxx represents the data in Figure xxix as a single graph of success ratios defined as the
number of successful update sessions per hour divided by the total number of update sessions per
hour. As Figure xxx shows, the average success ratios for update sessions over a duration of 24
hours have little variation and remain between 94% and just below 89%. This is an indication of
the impact of mirroring on profile availability as it will be demonstrated in more details later in this
section.
Figure xxxi shows the number of successful update sessions per day for the duration of our
experiment. While the numbers of successful sessions remains around 375000 for most of the
days, the variation in the numbers of successful sessions is contributed to the network connectivity
of some of the devices that would impact the total numbers of update sessions during those days.
The relatively constant numbers of unsuccessful update sessions up to the 36th day confirms our
explanation. After the 35th day where we turn off the rendezvous server, there is a spike in the
number of unsuccessful update sessions which is due to the fact that the clients can not find the
most recent IP addresses of other clients and unless the destination client has not changed its IP
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Figure xxix: Trend of average numbers of successful and unsuccessful update sessions for a day.
Figure xxx: Trend of average success ratios of update sessions for a day.
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Figure xxxi: Trend of average numbers of successful and unsuccessful update sessions for the
entire duration of experiment.
address or relay server it would not be reachable.
Figure xxxii shows the trend of success ratios of update sessions for the entire duration of our
experiment. While the success ratios for the first 35 days are around 92% for the last 5 days of the
experiment there is a decreasing trend which ends at 75% on the last day of our experiment. This
dropping trend is mostly due to the fact that the clients will more likely lose network connectivity
as time goes by and it is expected that on the long run most of the clients will renew their IP
addresses or relay server addresses due to churn and without the presence of the rendezvous server
these new connection information will not be available to other clients, hence they will not be
reachable.
Although a drop in the success ratio is expected when the rendezvous server goes down, the
slope of this drop is not that steep. This is contributed to the replication methods employed in
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Figure xxxii: Trend of average success ratios of update sessions for the entire duration of the
experiment.
MyZone. To put it in context, when a user device comes back online with a new connection it
would be unreachable by her friends since they don’t have the new connection information now
that the rendezvous server is down, but, as the user obtains more mirrors either through friends or
her own devices, the probability that one of her mirrors or other replicating devices has remained
online hence having the same connection information would increase. Therefore the more mirrors
a user has the more profile availability she gets even when the rendezvous server is down. It is
worth mentioning that even though the success ratio drops to 75% at the end of the experiment the
average success ratio is 89% for the entire duration of our experiment.
Next, we analyze the availability based on the posting sessions. When a user A posts something
on her friend B’s profile, A’s MyZone client application tries to send the post to B’s primary
device. If that device is not available A’s client application tries to post it on B’s secondary device
and if that is not available it will repeat this process for the tertiary and then the first rank mirror
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Figure xxxiii: Trend of average numbers of successful and unsuccessful posts for a day.
and so on. In case none of A’s devices and her mirrors are available, B will try to send this post
again after 5 minutes. In counting the number of unsuccessful posting sessions, counting all the
unsuccessful retries would result in an overestimation of unsuccessful sessions. Therefore, we
count each consecutive series of unsuccessful retries as only one.
Figure xxxiii shows the trend for average numbers of successful posting sessions for a day. As
in Figure xxix the average values are computed over the first 35 days of our experiment when the
rendezvous server was up. As it is shown in this figure, the posting trends are more dependent on
the hour of the day where there is little activity between the hours of 2 and 10, while most of the
activities fall between the hours of 15 and 22 mountain standard time. The reason for this can be
explained by the fact that most of our users are in the pacific timezone and it is expected that most
activities occur during the afternoon hours based on pacific timezone. Another observation is that
average numbers of unsuccessful posting sessions is relatively constant.
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Figure xxxiv: Trend of average success ratios of posts for a day.
Figure xxxiv plots the average success ratios of posting sessions over a day. As you can see all
the success ratios are in the interval of 73% and 96%. While the maximum success ratio of posting
sessions is comparable to the maximum success ratio of update sessions, the minimum in this case
is considerably less than the minimum success ratio for update sessions. The drop in the success
ratio of posting sessions is very much affected by the hour of the day and it is during those hours
that most of our subjects who are residing in the pacific timezone are sleeping and it is expected
that their machines are offline as our log files indicate as well. In addition, as we investigated in
our log files we realized that since the total number of posting sessions is a lot less that the total
number of update sessions, unsuccessful sessions in this case have far more impact on the success
ratio and even while most of our subjects have several mirrors, many of the posting sessions were
sent to the subjects that did not have any replicas or a few, causing the overall success ratio for
posting sessions to drop more than the success ratio for update sessions.
100
Figure xxxv: Trend of average numbers of successful and unsuccessful posts for the entire duration
of the experiment.
Figure xxxv shows the trend of successful and unsuccessful posting sessions for each day of
our experiment. As it is illustrated in this figure, the numbers of unsuccessful posting sessions
is almost constant and remain around 500 for the first 35 days of our experiment while there is a
sudden increase for the last 5 days due to the outage of the rendezvous server. The variation in the
numbers of successful posting sessions is contributed to the pattern of posts which varies on daily
basis.
Figure xxxvi represents the success ratios of posting sessions over the entire duration of our
experiment which has an average of 87% for the total duration and is almost constant for the first
35 days. The sudden drop for the last 5 days is due to the outage of the rendezvous server.
In order to show the effect of mirroring on availability in more details, we categorize users into
different groups based on the number of their own devices and mirrors. Figure xxxvii shows the
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Figure xxxvi: Trend of average success ratios of posts for the entire duration of the experiment.
Figure xxxvii: Number of subjects based on their number of mirrors and devices.
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distribution of the number of devices and mirrors for our subjects. As you can see in the diagram
the majority of our subjects i.e. approximately 90% of them, were able to obtain at least one mirror,
while around 20% had a secondary device available in addition to a primary device. Our results
indicate that it was fairly easy for most of our subjects to obtain one mirror while obtaining more
mirrors becomes harder. Note that mirroring in our design is purely based on the willingness of
other friends and the strength of social ties between the users impacts this willingness a lot. That
is why we refer to this method of mirroring as social hosting.
After categorizing our subjects into different groups based on their number of devices and mir-
rors we have plotted the success ratios of all posting and update sessions targeted for all subjects
belonging to each category for an average daily usage as well as for the entire duration of our
experiment. Figure xxxviii shows the plot of the average success ratios for all sessions targeted for
subjects of each group over a 24 hour period starting at midnight, as well as the number of subjects
for each group. Note that these values are computed as average values for the first 35 days of our
experiment where the rendezvous server was online. As you can see the availability of the first
group of people which consists of those that have no mirrors or additional devices i.e. no replicas,
is much less than the other groups. In fact out of the 6 subjects in this group 2 of them had nearly
full time connectivity and that actually boosted the overall success ratio and if we exclude those
two subjects from the group the average success ratio falls below 20%.
As it is expected the more mirrors and devices a user has the more profile availability it gets, but
what is interesting is that the additional gain in the availability would not be linear with respect to
the number of mirrors and devices. This means that an optimal number of mirrors and devices can
be suggested to a user based on her number of friends and availability. We plan to explore such
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recommendation systems in future works. Based on our results 1 mirror and 2 devices seems to
result in optimal availability.
Figure xxxix represents the success ratio of all posting and update sessions for each group of
users as defined before but for the entire duration of our experiment. As you can see the success
ratio in this figure have similar rankings to those in Figure xxxviii except for the last 5 days of the
experiment where the success ratios of users with 1 mirror and 2 devices is second only to those
users with 4 mirrors and 2 devices. After a careful analysis of our log files we noticed that 3 of the
users belonging to this group have the same mirror which did not lose connectivity during the last 5
days and hence it had the same connection information and therefore, even though the rendezvous
server was out, user profile for those three users were always available through that mirror and
hence the high overall success ratios for that entire group. Another observation is that the success
ratio of the users with no replicas would drop to almost 0% as the rendezvous server goes down.
Another way to explore the impact of having a mirror on the availability is to measure the
proportion of sessions that were handled by the mirrors instead of the user devices. For this,
we have computed the ratio of the number of sessions handled by mirrors to the total number of
sessions for each group of users based on their number of mirrors and we called this ratio as the
impact ratio to denote the actual impact of having one, two, three or four mirrors on the profile
availability of users. Figure xl shows the result of this analysis. As you can see, having one mirror
has around 32% impact on profile availability while having 2 mirrors increases this number to 42%
which means that a second mirror results in around 10% increase in the overall profile availability.
As for more than two mirrors the added availability is very small so we can conclude that there is
an optimal number of mirrors based on the profile availability gained and in case of our experiment
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Figure xl: Average impact ratio of the availability of subjects based on their number of mirrors
over the entire duration of the experiment.
Figure xli: Average impact ratio of the availability of subjects based on the rank of the mirror over
the entire duration of the experiment.
it is 2. This number is a function of the overlap in terms of connectivity times of mirror devices
and the mirrored user as well as the duration of their connectivity. In other words selecting mirrors
that are mostly online during times that the original user is offline would decrease the number of
mirrors one requires, to have most profile availability. As a future work we intend to integrate a
recommendation system for MyZone client application that would analyze the connectivity times
of friends and based on that, recommends the most appropriate friends as potential mirrors.
While Figure xl shows the impact ratio of the number of mirrors on the overall availability we
also wanted to see on average how much impact a mirror would have on the availability of the
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Figure xlii: The average impact ratio of the availability of subjects based on their number of devices
over the entire duration of the experiment.
original user based on the rank of the mirror. As mentioned in Section 6.2, when a user’s primary
device is offline all the requests for that user are going to be handled by its replicas starting at its
secondary device and moving onto tertiary device and then first ranked mirror and so on until an
available mirror is found. Figure xli shows the impact of the mirrors based on their ranks on the
profile availability of users. The impact ratio is computed in the same fashion as in Figure xl except
that in here the impact ratio is computed for the rank of each mirror individually. As you can see,
the first ranked mirrors are responsible for approximately 27% of the gain in profile availability
while second ranked mirrors are responsible for around 10% and third and fourth ranked mirrors
have very little impact. These results confirm with our earlier results that suggested an optimal
number of mirrors for maximum gained availability.
The important outcome from Figures xl and xli is that choosing the right mirrors is more im-
portant than the number of mirrors. This was illustrated by the fact that the added advantage of
having more than 2 mirrors in our experiment is very little.
Finally in Figure xlii we show the average impact of primary and secondary devices on profile
availability. As you can see a second device would result in 20% more impact on the availability
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which is considerable when only one device is resulting in 60% impact ratio. This shows that even
if users can not obtain a mirror having additional devices would have a decent impact on increasing
their availability. Of course when a user replicates her profile on several devices their connectivities
are usually non overlapping which means when one is connected the others are usually offline and
overall this would increase the effectiveness of self replication. In the next section we explore the
resource utilization of MyZone which is a very important factor on the feasibility of such a system
in practical situations.
9.3 Resource Utilization
In MyZone the resource usage of the client application for a user is affected by the number of
friends a user has and her interactions with them as well as the volume of the content generated by
the user in form of her profile. Intuitively, if a user chooses to mirror for another friend resource
utilization of the client application will increase as the function of the number of friends and profile
size of the mirrored friend.
Based on its design described in section 6.2, MyZone is a multithreaded application that is
considered IO intensive since the main tasks that MyZone implements involve network communi-
cations and file modifications. In other words the main two resources that are used in MyZone are
storage and network bandwidth. As described earlier in section 8.2, MyZone manages its storage
usage by invoking the cleaner process on specific events. The cleaner process limits MyZone’s
total used storage by imposing restrictions on both the storage space used by the user’s own social
network in form of a cache and her mirrored friends’ profiles in form of mirror capacities. The
limits imposed by the cleaner process are set by the user as part of MyZone’s settings and can be
109
Figure xliii: Histogram of the number of users with respect to the mirroring storage capacity they
are willing to allocate.
changed at anytime. MyZone has an optimal traffic usage which means no portion of data is going
to be sent to another user more than once as explained in 8.2.
While the resource utilization of the client application related to the user profile is inevitable,
the mirroring is optional and since mirroring is an essential part of MyZone, in this section we
analyze the storage and bandwidth utilization of MyZone client application related to mirroring,
in order to explore the feasibility of mirroring on such a system. The bandwidth utilization of
MyZone for the user profile will be analyzed as part of scalability aspect in the next section.
First we explore the willingness of users for allocating mirror storage to their friends by plotting
the histogram of the number of users willing to be mirrors based on the storage that they are willing
to allocate for mirroring. Figure xliii shows this diagram. The horizontal axis starts from 500 as
our design limits the minimum allocated storage to 500 MB. As you can see most of the users
are comfortably allocating between 500 to 1500 MB of disk space to mirror their friends. In
comparison to the size of a typical hard disk these numbers are very small and that is why one
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Figure xliv: Distribution of the number of mirroring users based on the actual size of the mirrored
profiles.
would expect most users to be easily willing to allocate that much space to their friends. For the
very small number of users who are willing to allocate larger spaces to their mirrored friends, we
have noticed that the social tie between the mirror and the mirrored users plays a considerable role
in the willingness of the mirror.
Next we measure the actual size of the profiles stored on each mirror to get a sense of how much
space is actually used on each mirror. Figures xliv and xlv show the distribution and cumulative
distribution of the number of mirrors based on the size of the mirrored profile. Figure xliv indicates
that most of the mirrored profiles occupy between 3MB and 23MB of storage while very few have
much larger sizes. In fact 95% of mirrored profile sizes are less than 73MB as shown in Figure
xlv. This implies that the amount of disk space users are willing to allocate for mirroring is a lot
more than the actual amount of storage used for mirroring. Our results show that the tendency to
allocate much larger than required space, for mirroring has strong correlation with self identified
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Figure xlv: Cumulative distribution of the number of mirroring users based on the actual size of
the mirrored profiles.
social ties among users. This indicates that users are not stingy when it comes to allocating space
for mirroring people whom they have strong social ties with, which implies that users are willing
to participate in social hosting.
After showing that mirroring requires little storage, we now move on to analyze the bandwidth
consumption for mirroring. For this, we first measured the traffic for each of the 94 mirrored
profiles on each of their mirrors as well as the size of the stored mirrored profiles. In order to
show the impact of the traffic generated by each mirrored profile as a function of its size, we then
computed the ratio of the generated traffic by all mirrors of a profile, to the size of the profile for all
94 mirrored profiles. Finally, we plotted the graph of these ratios after sorting them in increasing
order. Figure xlvi shows the resulting graph. This graph shows the growing trend of traffic to
used storage for mirrored profiles. The ratio of traffic to profile size for a mirrored user x roughly
indicates how many of x’s friends have used the mirror to interact with x, i.e. either post or receive
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Figure xlvi: The growth trend of traffic to used storage ratio for mirrored profiles.
updates, with x.
As the graph implies the growth trend indicates a linear behavior where the ratios start at just
over 1 and grow to just under 75. As we investigated in our log files we realized that this ratio
is more a function of the availability of the original user and the rank of the mirror (as will be
discussed later) than anything else as almost all of our subjects had the same number of friends.
As the average number of friends in our social network is 98 we can conclude that based on Figure
xlvi on average a mirror is responsible for handling the requests of approximately 35 friends of
each mirrored user as the total traffic to profile size should be equal to the number of friends for
each user. This is due to the optimal traffic generation of MyZone as described in 6.2. Therefore,
in total, mirrors are responsible for nearly 35% of the total traffic in our experiment.
Finally we wanted to investigate how the generated traffic handled by the mirrors is distributed
among different ranks of mirrors. Figure xlvii shows the total generated traffic for mirrored profiles
based on the rank of the mirror. As you can see most of the traffic is handled by the first ranked
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Figure xlvii: Total amount of traffic generated by mirrors based on their rank.
mirrors and there is super linear decline in the traffic handled by higher ranked mirrors. This
indicates that another factor affecting the traffic handled by a mirror is its rank. As the rank of the
mirror increases, the amount of traffic it is expected to handle decreased super linearly. In the next
section we will investigate the scalability aspects of MyZone.
9.4 Scalability
As was mentioned earlier in section 9.3 the resource utilization of MyZone can be divided into
those related to the user’s own social network and those that are related to mirrored users. We
analyzed the resource usage of MyZone for the mirrored users in the previous section. In this
section we investigate that portion of MyZone’s resource utilization that directly relates to the
device owner’s social network. Since this portion is not optional as mirroring, it can be a restricting
factor in the scalability of the system. In this section, we will examine the bounding effects of the
resource utilization of MyZone client application on its scalability as a function of the size of the
social network. Based on the design of MyZone, the restrictive resources that can potentially limit
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the scalability of MyZone, are network bandwidth usage and processing time.
We first analyze the effect of network bandwidth usage of MyZone client application on scala-
bility by varying both the size of the social network of the user and the network bandwidth itself
while measuring the response time of the client. Later on we report the CPU utilization of MyZone
client application as an indicator of the effect of processing time on scalability.
To measure the effect of the network bandwidth we have decided to emulate the load on a user
client application based on varying number of friends and network bandwidth while measuring the
response times. We have chosen 5, 20, and 100 Mbps bandwidths as representative bandwidths for
users with slow, moderate and high speed connections to explore the behavior of a client applica-
tion under realistic scenarios.
For this emulation, we modeled the traffic received at a client application based on observed traf-
fics in our experiment. In order to increase the confidence interval of our models, we modeled the
traffic on three different categories namely, the minimum, the average and the maximum observed
traffics. For each combination of network bandwidth, and received traffic category and number of
friends there was an emulation cycle lasting 24 hours. We measured the minimum, average and
maximum response times for each emulation cycle and we analyzed the scalability of MyZone
based on the observed response times. Table iv summarizes all the different configurations for our
emulations.
The variations on the number of friends are based on recent statistics published on Facebook’s
social graph [28] which indicate that most users have less than 200 friends while a very small
fraction of them have much larger number of friends. In fact according to the same report, the
median number of friends and the average number of friends for a Facebook user is 99 and 243
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Table iv: Different configurations for our emulations.
Number of Friends Traffic Network Bandwidth
50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600 Minimum, Average, Maximum 5, 20, 100 Mbps
Figure xlviii: The trend of the average received traffic ratios for minimum, average, and maximum
traffics observed by subjects during a day.
respectively.
We modeled the received traffics after those observed in the first 35 days of our experiment. For
this, first, we measured the maximum, minimum and average traffics received by a client in our
experiment. Figure xlviii shows the trend of received traffics for all three categories. As you can
see the trend of minimum traffic is almost constant while the maximum and average traffics have
similar trends with variations depending on the hour of the day.
Next, we measure the maximum number of connections received by a client application, this
represents the maximum number of received posting and update sessions combined, for a single
user. Figure xlix represents the distribution of the maximum number of connections received by a
user during a day in our experiment. The reason that we use the maximum instead of the average
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Figure xlix: Distribution of the maximum number of connections received by a subject during a
day of our experiment.
is because we want to make sure that our model is not underestimating the load on a client.
Finally, based on the traffic trend and the connection trend derived from our experiment we
compute traffic and connection models for different number of friends denoted in Table iv and
emulate different scenarios by generating traffic using our traffic models and multiplexing them
using our connection models. Figure l shows the estimated traffic distributions for 18 different
classes of traffics that we are emulating.
We ran each of our emulations for 24 hours using an Apple R© Macbook Air machine equipped
with Intel R© Core 2 Duo 2.13 GHz processor and 4 GB of memory and 256 GB of Solid State Drive.
The computer was intentionally being used for common tasks during our emulation to provide a
more realistic usage scenario. The connection between the traffic generator and the client machine
was through a NETGEAR R© network switch where the bandwidth was limited for each emulation
cycle based on configuration settings stated in Table iv. Also the switch was only routing the traffic
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Figure l: Estimated minimum, average, maximum traffic distributions received by a user during a
day based on her number of friends.
related to our emulations to make sure that our measurements would only reflect the response time
of our application and nothing else.
Figure li shows the results of our emulation as a histogram diagram of response times in log
scale. For each number of friends there are 9 bars each representing the average response time for
a combination of traffic model and bandwidth capacity. In addition, for each bar there is a lower
cap and an upper cap that represent the minimum and maximum response times observed for that
particular emulation cycle.
The following observations can be made based on our results:
1. The growing trend of the average response times as the number of friends increases is sub
linear in all cases but one.
2. The minimum response times are much closer to the average response times as contrary to
maximum response times that deviate much more from the average response times. The
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Figure lii: Percentage of response times over 100 ms for variations of traffic, number of friends
and network bandwidth.
main reason for this is that the maximum response times are always observed in the very
first replies where the client is merging all the updated profile contents since last successful
session into one temporary file to send back as reply. Therefore this one time per session
computation contributes significantly to the maximum response time.
3. The average response times for the 5Mbps bandwidth have super linear growth. This clearly
indicates that the bandwidth is the contributing factor to the response time and not the load,
as the traffic model for this particular case needs more than 5Mbps of bandwidth.
In many network applications 100ms response time is considered extremely good and 500ms
response time is considered good. That is why in Figures lii and liii we measure the scalability of
our client application based on the percentage of response times over 100ms and 500ms, for each
of our emulation cycles. As Figure lii indicates, the percentage of response times over 100ms falls
below 50% for all but maximum traffic models which indicates a very good performance. As for
the maximum traffic, while those percentages rise to over 50% for 20 and 100Mbps in cases where
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Figure liii: Percentage of response times over 500 ms for variations of traffic, number of friends
and network bandwidth.
the user has over 800 friends, the limited 5Mbps bandwidth causes that percentage to rise beyond
90%. This shows that MyZone client application would have extremely good performance for up
to 800 friends over moderate to high speed connections.
Figure liii represents the same set of data for 500ms instead. As you can see this time with the
exception of maximum traffic over 5Mbps bandwidth, almost all (at least 94%) of response times
fall within 500ms. This indicates that MyZone client application has reasonably good performance
even with 1600 friends which is much larger than the current average number of friends on popular
social networks like Facebook.
Finally we report the maximum cpu utilization for each of our emulation cycles in Figure liv.
The cpu utilizations reported here are based on the numbers reported from the activity monitor
application as part of Mac OS Lion for a single core. As you can see the cpu utilization is also sub
linear and is bounded by 71% for the case where maximum traffic is loaded on the client with 1600
friends. As for response times, we observed that most of the cpu utilizations are contributed to
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Figure liv: Maximum cpu utilization of the client application observed based on number of friends.
the merging stage of user’s profile where the latest updates are computed by selecting each profile
entry based on the client friend’s permissions on that entry. This happens only at the start of each
session and in comparison, the session encryption has very little cpu utilization.
We also did exhaustive load testing on the relay and rendezvous servers to measure their scala-
bility in terms of the total number of clients they can handle while providing response times under
100 and 500ms. We realized that in all cases network bandwidth was the only factor that affected
the response times. In other words the response times are all under 100ms up to a point where the
load on the relay and rendezvous servers saturates the bandwidth. This shows that the relay and
rendezvous servers themselves are very lightweight and use very little CPU and memory and in
case of the rendezvous server very little storage for the database.
In conclusion our results show that MyZone achieves very high availability through social host-
ing and self replication. They also indicate that its resource utilization is low while its scalability
is considerably high for even much larger number of friends than the reported average on social
networking sites such as Facebook. Our results encourage us to believe that MyZone can be a real
competition for existing centralized social networks while addressing the weaknesses of existing
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OSN providers.
10 Summary of Work
In this chapter we summarize our work and list our contributions. In the end we identify interesting
research trends that can extend our work.
The busy lifestyle of a growing number of people has made conventional ways of socializing
a luxury not available to all. Online social networks have made it possible for these people, to
extend their social connections, while maintaining their existing ones. This has made OSNs a huge
success with hundreds of millions of people using their services on daily basis. The large number
of users has transformed OSNs into a more effective social media to spread ideas, news, opinions
and more, comparing to conventional ones.
Despite all their benefits, OSN service providers have been known to violate user privacy by
selling user information to market researchers and other businesses. This has raised a lot of concern
in recent years, as people are becoming more and more aware of it and frequent changes in user
privacy policies has only contributed to this.
Furthermore, their growing use as a powerful social media has made them an effective tool to
organize popular movements. This has made them a target of different attacks by the opposing
entities. These attacks vary from traffic filtering to denial of service attacks to hijacking user
information.
Finally, ever-changing user interfaces and growing number of service providers have only made
the user experience more frustrating. These shortcomings have motivated us to propose a peer to
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peer design for a next-generation online social network called MyZone.
To our knowledge, MyZone is the first social network with the following properties:
• It preserves user privacy by storing user information on their own devices and replicating
them on a number of other devices belonging to trusted friends (introduced as social hosting).
• It is secure based on a “need to know basis” philosophy and all connections are encrypted.
• It is resilient to widespread attacks and outages implemented by entities as powerful as gov-
ernments.
• The local deployment model can be set up conveniently and quickly to construct a private
OSN for a limited number of users.
• It is backward compatible and a wide variety of client applications with different user inter-
faces and features can coexist while users can choose the applications that fit their needs and
preferences.
• Finally, the application itself can be setup by anyone and does not require any special hosting
services.
In this work we have done the following:
1. We designed a distributed peer to peer social network called MyZone with the above prop-
erties.
2. We proved the feasibility of such a system by implementing the service layer part for local
deployment scenario and a feature rich client application that competes with existing social
networks such as Facebook.
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3. We provided experimental results and proved the effectiveness of our design based on avail-
ability, resource utilization and scalability aspects. Based on our experimental results, we
showed that our proposed design can be a potential candidate to replace existing centralized
social networks with the goal of providing more user privacy while being secure and resilient
to attacks.
10.1 Future Works
The availability of user profiles even when the users are offline, was identified as perhaps the most
serious obstacle faced by any peer to peer OSN. Our design addresses this by self replication as well
as selecting mirrors among friends referred to as “social hosting”. Selecting the most appropriate
friends as mirrors, is an interesting problem that is not addressed by our design yet. This is a
twofold problem:
1. Selecting friends that result in maximum availability.
2. In spite of limited resources available to portable devices, obtaining mirrors is competitive.
Therefore, a user may need to propose incentives to potential candidates in order to motivate
them to accept to be her mirrors.
Providing minimal incentives while increasing the chances of acceptance is analogous to the
problem of bidding in online auctions.
Therefore, creating a mirror recommendation system can be an interesting problem. A practical
way of searching MyZone, while complying with all the user privacy and access control policies,
is a very useful and yet hard to implement feature and is left out of our design for future works.
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Finally, developing a client application for mobile users and optimizing the design for better per-
formance in a mobile environment with much higher rate of churn is an interesting subject left for
future investigations.
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Table v: XML Schema for settings.
<xs:element name="settings">
<xs:attribute name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="maxNumberOfChanges" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:attribute name="CAServerName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="rendezvousServerAddress" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="rendezvousServerPort" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:attribute name="relayServerAddress" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="relayServerPort" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:attribute name="STUNServerAddress" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="STUNServerPort" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:attribute name="cacheSize" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:attribute name="MyZonePort" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:attribute name="devPriority" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastSyncTime1" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastSyncTime2" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
A Appendix
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Table vi: XML Schema for mirror entry.
<xs:element name="mirror">
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="passphrase" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="capacity" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="used" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="priority" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastSyncTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastModifiedTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="status" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:element>
Table vii: XML Schema for friends.
<xs:element name="friend">
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastUpdateTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="passphrase" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="status" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="ipAddress" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="port" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="relayAddress" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="relayPort" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="typeOfProtocol" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="latestVersion" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:element name="mirrors">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
Table viii: XML Schema for passphrase entry.
<xs:element name="passphraseEntry">
<xs:attribute name="passphrase" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="username" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:element>
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Table ix: XML Schema for zone entry.
<xs:element name="zone">
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastUpdateTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="name" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="refreshInterval" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="members">
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
Table x: XML Schema for file list entries.
<xs:element name="entry">
<xs:attribute name="owner" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="zone" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="path" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="filename" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="filesize" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:element>
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Table xi: XML Schema for basic user information.
<xs:element name="info">
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastUpdateTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:element name="basic">
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="sex" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="dateOfBirth">
<xs:element name="year" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="month" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="day" type="xs:integer"/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="relationshipStatus" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="aboutMe" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="profilePic" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="education">
<xs:element name="level" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="degree" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="major" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="institution" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="startYear" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="finishYear" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="employment">
<xs:element name="position" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="institution" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="startYear" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="finishYear" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
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Table xii: XML Schema for events.
<xs:element name="event">
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastUpdateTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:element name="title" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="description" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="location" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="decision" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="creator">
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="startDate">
<xs:element name="date">
<xs:element name="year" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="month" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="day" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="hour" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="minute" type="xs:integer"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="endDate">
<xs:element name="date">
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="pendingNotification">
<xs:element name="user">
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="invitees">
<xs:element name="user">
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="accepted">
<xs:element name="user">
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="declined">
<xs:element name="user">
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
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Table xiii: XML Schema for private messages.
<xs:element name="message">
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="encrypted" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="sender">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="receiver">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="subject" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="body" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:element>
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Table xiv: XML Schema for wall posts.
<xs:element name="wallPost">
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastUpdateTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="postedBy">
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="body" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="like">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="dislike">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="comment">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="body" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
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Table xv: XML Schema for link posts.
<xs:element name="link">
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastUpdateTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="postedBy">
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="url" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="description" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="like">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="dislike">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="comment">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="body" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
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Table xvi: XML Schema for photo albums.
<xs:element name="photoAlbum">
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastUpdateTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="postedBy">
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="title" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="photo">
<xs:attribute name="parentAlbum" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastUpdateTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="postedBy">
<xs:element name="user">
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="filename" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="description" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="like">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="dislike">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="comment">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="body" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="like">
<xs:element name="dislike">
<xs:element name="comment">
</xs:element>
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Table xvii: XML Schema for audio albums.
<xs:element name="audioAlbum">
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastUpdateTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="postedBy">
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="title" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="audio">
<xs:attribute name="parentAlbum" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastUpdateTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="postedBy">
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="title" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="artist" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="album" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="filename" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="description" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="like">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="dislike">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="comment">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="body" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="like">
<xs:element name="dislike">
<xs:element name="comment">
</xs:element>
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Table xviii: XML Schema for video albums.
<xs:element name="videoAlbum">
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastUpdateTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="postedBy">
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="title" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="video">
<xs:attribute name="parentAlbum" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastUpdateTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="postedBy">
<xs:element name="user">
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="title" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="filename" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="description" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="like">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="dislike">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="comment">
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="grandParent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="belongsTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="shareWith" type:"xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="body" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="like">
<xs:element name="dislike">
<xs:element name="comment">
</xs:element>
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Table xix: XML Schema for deleted entries.
<xs:element name="deletedEntry">
<xs:attribute name="parent" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="lastUpdateTime" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="postedBy" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="shareWith" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
Table xx: XML Schema for pending change entry.
<xs:element name="pendingChange">
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="action" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:attribute name="elementId" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
<xs:attribute name="shareWith" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="postedBy">
<xs:element name="user">
<xs:element name="username" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="memberSince" type="xs:unsignedLong"/>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
142
